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ABSTRACT
This piece focuses on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
the Cleveland school voucher case, and the constitutional questions that have already begun to
appear in its aftermath. After describing the constitutional crossroads at which the Zelman Court
found itself, we offer a close reading of the Zelman opinions, paying special attention to the
normative vision of church-state relations that each presupposes, the values that the Court failed
to explore, and practical questions about the range of school settings to which Zelman might
ultimately be applied. The piece then explores the legal and constitutional future of the voucher
movement, with respect to education as well as other social services. This section first focuses
on knotty questions of state constitutional law, and the interplay of those questions with federal
constitutional norms, that have arisen in Zelman’s wake. The piece then turns to the debate about
regulatory conditions that might be imposed upon providers in voucher programs. Viewing the
problem in light of the Supreme Court’s tangled jurisprudence of unconstitutional conditions and
religious accommodation, we explore conditions related to school performance, student
admissions, faculty hiring, and controversial expression by providers. Finally, we analyze the
importance of Zelman outside the field of education, by probing the decision’s implications for
the President’s Faith-Based Initiative – that is, for efforts by government to enlist faith-based
organizations in providing a variety of social services.
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On the eve of the Supreme Court’s fateful decision in the Cleveland voucher case,2 only
the most ostrich-like Separationist could have denied the flux in the law of the Establishment
Clause. Whether the context be access of private parties to public fora for purposes of religious
expression,3 or direct government transfer of material resources to religious institutions,4 norms
of non-Establishment have been tending sharply toward the paradigm of Neutrality and away
from the metaphorical wall of church-state separation. Only in the area of government speech on
religious matters, such as school-sponsored prayer or religious holiday displays, has the law
moved toward increased separation between religion and government.5
Zelman represents the most recent and dramatic move away from Separationism. By
holding in no uncertain terms that the Cleveland school voucher program satisfies constitutional
requirements, the Supreme Court has opened the door for a wide range of relationships, once
thought impermissible, between government and religious institutions. The key to these new
relationships, the Court held, is the concept of “true,” “genuine,” and “independent” private
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choice to partake of services offered by religious entities. For the first time, the law explicitly
permits government to spend money for the payment of tuition at religious elementary and
secondary schools, even if those schools offer faith-intensive academic programs. The Court’s
decision places absolutely no restriction on the use of the tuition funds received by participating
schools.
The outcome in Zelman, decided by a vote of 5-4, may have been close, but the question
it answers has now been firmly resolved. Unlike other hotly disputed areas of constitutional law,
such as state sovereign immunity or the death penalty, in which a fractured Court promises only
future litigation, uncertainty, and a fair probability of a pendulum swing, the voucher decision
both captures the trajectory of contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence and resolves a
particular question in a way highly unlikely to be revisited.
The certainty of the resolution of the question in Zelman is not matched, however, by the
adequacy of its justifications and its reasoning. Even the most ardent fans of vouchers should
recognize the costs of a radically untheorized invocation of “private choice” as a response to
deeply felt, long-held constitutional concerns. When the grounds upon which such an important
decision rest are unexplained, or are attributed disingenuously and entirely to unelaborated
principles laid down in prior cases, its future is left to twist in the winds created by its critics.
We think there is much to be said for the first premises in Zelman, but the decision’s
underpinnings require elaboration if they are to be sufficiently grounded in constitutional values.
Moreover, Zelman is only the beginning, not the termination point, of constitutional litigation
over voucher arrangements. In what follows, we explore the Zelman opinions, the questions
those opinions suggest but fail to answer, and the implications of the decision for the future of
3

relations between the state and religious entities. In Part I, we first describe the constitutional
crossroads at which the Zelman Court found itself,6 and then offer a close reading of the Zelman
opinions, paying special attention to the normative vision of church-state relations that each
presupposes, the values that the Court failed to explore, and practical questions about the range
of school settings to which Zelman might ultimately be applied.
Part II explores the legal and constitutional future of the voucher movement, with respect
to education as well as other social services. Part IIA. focuses on knotty questions of state
constitutional law, and its interplay with federal constitutional norms, that have already begun to
arise in Zelman’s wake. Indeed, the ink in Zelman was barely dry when a Florida Circuit Court
ruled that the Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program violates the church-state provisions of
the Florida Constitution,7 and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in
Davey v. Locke8 that a church-state provision in the Washington Constitution, as applied in a
particular case, violates the federal Free Exercise Clause. Part IIB explores the debate about
regulatory conditions that might be imposed upon providers in voucher programs in light of the
Supreme Court’s tangled jurisprudence of unconstitutional conditions and religious
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accommodation. Here, we explore conditions related to school performance, student admissions,
faculty hiring, and controversial expression by providers. Finally, Part IIC analyzes the
importance of Zelman outside the field of education, by probing the decision’s implications for
the President’s Faith-Based Initiative – that is, for efforts by government to enlist faith-based
organizations in providing a variety of social services. In this context, too, Zelman has had
immediate impact, as revealed by the very recent decision by a federal district court in Wisconsin
to uphold a voucher-type arrangement for state financing of a faith-intensive drug rehabilitation
program.9

I. Zelman
A. Background
The voucher controversy arose from a crisis in Cleveland’s public school system, which
was generally regarded as one of the worst in the nation. Dismal and worsening rates of
educational achievement prompted a federal district court judge to transfer control of the
Cleveland schools to the state.10 In 1996, responding to this crisis, Ohio enacted the Pilot Project
Scholarship Program, which offers parents of Cleveland school children several options. Under
the Scholarship Program, Cleveland parents can receive a tuition voucher redeemable either at
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Zelman, 122 Sup. Ct. at ___, slip op. at 1-2.
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participating private schools in Cleveland, or at participating public schools in districts adjacent
to Cleveland.11 Alternatively, parents whose children remain in Cleveland’s public schools can
choose to receive a voucher for after school tutoring.12 Both the tuition and tutoring vouchers
give priority to low-income families.13
Voucher opponents, led by teachers’ unions and People for the American Way,
challenged the Scholarship Program the moment it was enacted. The challengers claimed that
the program violated the federal and Ohio state constitutions because the tuition vouchers could
be redeemed at religious schools – indeed the majority of participating private schools were
religious. The Ohio Supreme Court found that the voucher program legislation violated a
technical requirement of the Ohio Constitution, and thus held the program invalid.14 The Ohio
legislature quickly remedied the technical defect and the voucher program was re-enacted; again
the opponents filed suit to block the program, though this time in federal district court. The
federal district court ruled that the voucher program violated the Establishment Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld that ruling, and the
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Id. at 3-4. The plan paid a maximum of $2250 per child per year for tuition;
participating private schools had to agree to charge no more than $2500 per year, leaving a $250
co-payment to be made by the family. No adjacent public school districts have ever agreed to
participate in the program. Id. at 5.
12
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Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 86 Ohio St. 3d 1, 711 N.E.2d 203 (1999) (holding
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Supreme Court granted certiorari. At each judicial level, courts stayed injunctive relief in order
to avoid educational disruption for those families who were already participating in the program,
pending final resolution of the case; by the time the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Zelman, the voucher program had been operating for six years.
In Zelman, the Court faced the intersection – one might say collision – of two distinct
lines of establishment clause jurisprudence. The first, exemplified by Committee for Public
Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,15 prohibited substantial, unrestricted government
support for religious primary and secondary schools. Nyquist, decided in 1973, invalidated New
York State’s program of tuition grants and tax credits for low and middle income parents whose
children attended private elementary and secondary schools. The overwhelming majority of
beneficiaries of the program were parents with children in Catholic schools. Despite the fact that
the aid ran to the parents and not directly to the schools, the Nyquist Court held that the program
was a nonneutral attempt to ensure the financial survival of religious schools. As such, it
violated then-controlling Separationist principles16 by having a “primary effect” of advancing
religion and promoting “political divisiveness” along sectarian lines.17
To voucher opponents, the Ohio Scholarship Program ran directly against the principles
of Nyquist’s “no aid separationism.” In Cleveland, religious schools offered nearly all of the
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available seats for voucher students; the program placed no restrictions on the use of voucher
funds; and the program did not require participating religious schools to allow voucher students
to “opt out” of religious education or worship. The Program thus appeared to advance religion in
apparent violation of Separationist principles.18
To voucher supporters, however, the case for the Ohio Program tracked a second and
more recent line of establishment clause decisions, running from Mueller v. Allen19 through
Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind20 to Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District.21 In Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, the Court rejected establishment clause
challenges to programs in which government funds reached religious institutions only “as a result
of the genuinely independent choices of aid recipients.”22 These intervening independent
choices, the Court reasoned, disconnected the government from any religious experience that a
given voucher beneficiary might receive along with – or as part of – the services “purchased”
with the voucher. In arguing that the Ohio program offered such independent choices, voucher
supporters pointed to the wide range of educational options available to Cleveland parents, which
included publicly supported magnet schools, independent but public community (charter)
schools, tuition scholarships to private schools, and tutoring scholarships for those who remained
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the program. 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
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in any public school.23
The Court’s resolution of the conflict in the decisional law between Nyquist and
strenuous no-aid Separationism, on the one hand, and the theory of intervening private choice, on
the other, cannot be understood without an appraisal of its very recent, paradigm-confronting
decision in Mitchell v. Helms.24 Mitchell involved an as-applied challenge to a joint federal-state
program which loaned educational equipment and materials – for example, books, computers,
software, video players, and video tapes – to schools, public and private, in low-income areas.
The governing statute limited these materials to “secular, nonideological” uses.25 Several
precedents from the Nyquist era had held similar programs to constitute substantial aid to
religious education and therefore unconstitutional.26 Mitchell overruled those precedents, and
dramatically recast the Supreme Court line-up in cases involving direct aid to religious
institutions.
Four Justices – Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Thomas, all of whom are part of the Zelman majority – joined a plurality opinion in Mitchell that
made formal neutrality and secular purpose the sole Establishment Clause requirements for a
direct aid program. So long as the program had been designed to advance secular ends – in
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The Court in Zelman elaborates on magnet schools and community (charter) schools at
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Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000).
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Mitchell, the secular educational purpose appeared quite obvious – and encompassed a broad
class of schools, both religious and secular, the plurality declared its willingness to uphold it.27
The Mitchell plurality also explicitly and vehemently repudiated a central tenet of the
Separationist ethos. From the time of Lemon v. Kurtzman28 until the decision in Mitchell, the
Court had repeatedly insisted that the state could not aid “pervasively sectarian” institutions.29
Such aid, the reasoning went, would either advance religion or excessively entangle the state with
religion in the effort to be sure that the aid went exclusively to secular uses. Reciting persuasive
evidence of the anti-Catholic provenance of this doctrine, the plurality concluded that the
doctrine had been the product of religious bigotry and should be abandoned.30
Three Justices – Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter, and Justice Stevens, all of whom
dissented in Zelman as well – dissented in Mitchell.31 Hewing to all of the premises of no-aid
Separationism, they insisted that the program violated the Establishment Clause because it
advanced religion in at least two ways – by freeing up private resources for religious teaching,32
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403 U.S. 602 (1971). As recently as 1988, Chief Justice Rehnquist had authored an
opinion which had appeared to reaffirm this doctrine, Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988),
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Kennedy, JJ, concurring).
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that bars aid to “pervasively sectarian” institutions).
31
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and by creating a substantial risk of diversion of government assistance to religious uses.33
Justices Breyer and O’Connor – whose votes split in Zelman – cast the deciding votes in
Mitchell in a concurring opinion that currently represents the governing law on direct government
aid to religious entities.34 The O’Connor-Breyer opinion rejected the premises of both the
plurality and the dissents. For the concurring Justices, the plurality went too far in the direction
of Establishment Clause Neutralism;35 secular purpose and neutral coverage criteria are indeed
constitutionally necessary, but not sufficient to satisfy the Establishment Clause. What is also
required, in direct aid cases, is assurance that the government’s assistance is not in fact being
used for specifically religious activities, such as worship. But the concurring Justices similarly
rejected the dissent’s broad, prophylactic approach to assuring that state aid was not so used;
courts, the concurring opinion concluded, must look at the precise ways in which government aid
is being used, not simply at the identity of the recipient institution. Given this approach, the
program challenged in Mitchell had sufficient safeguards against diversion to religious use, and
therefore satisfied the Establishment Clause.
In light of the very recent backdrop provided by Mitchell, it was hardly a surprise that
defenders of the Ohio Scholarship program targeted Justice O’Connor as the key vote. They
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530 U.S. at 836-67. This concurrence represents the narrowest ground supporting the
result, and thus operates as the Court’s holding. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977).
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We elaborate on the general paradigms of Religion Clause Separationism and
Neutralism in Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
Constitutional Order, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 37 (2002) (hereafter “Distinctive Place”) and Sites of
Redemption, note xx supra.
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needed but one to add to the four in the Mitchell plurality, for whom the secular purpose and
formal neutrality of the voucher plan would suffice. Justice Breyer’s vote was hard to predict;
his joining in the Mitchell concurrence had come as a bit of a surprise. By contrast, Justice
O’Connor had evidenced strong prior interest in this field,36 and her jurisprudential style
frequently revealed tendencies to be fact-specific and flexible in her approach. Moreover, she
had joined in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, the three lynchpins of the theory supporting
“independent choice” as the crucial variable. If the voucher proponents lost Justice Breyer’s
vote, they could still win with Justice O’Connor’s; but if they lost Justice O’Connor’s vote, they
were highly likely to lose the case.
That Justice O’Connor’s vote was crucial to the outcome created tactical questions for
both sides. Arguments that the Cleveland program was formally neutral between religion and
nonreligion were necessary but not sufficient to win her support. She had to be persuaded by
arguments about “private choice.” Voucher proponents concentrated their arguments precisely
and strenuously on that point.37 Voucher opponents, by contrast, did not want to concede that
some voucher programs – those with sufficient choice – were constitutional. They concentrated
their arguments on Nyquist and its place in the theory of no-aid Separationism.38 Zelman was
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Justice O’Connor is the author of the “endorsement” theory of Establishment Clause
adjudication, see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, xxx-xxx (1984) (O’Connor, J, concurring), a
theory which has become the law in cases involving religious speech by government. Allegheny
County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). She is also the author of the most immediate, preMitchell case involving aid to religious schools, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), which
overruled prior law and began to blaze a new, more fact-dependent trail in direct aid cases.
37
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won and lost on these tactical decisions, and the opinions it produced can only be appreciated in
light of what divided as well what united their authors on the eve of decision.
B. The Zelman Opinions: Explication and Critique
Those looking beyond the result to the possibility of nuance, constitutional innovation, or
normative depth in resolving the momentous conflict presented in Zelman cannot have been
satisfied by the opinions. By a 5-4 vote, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Ohio
Scholarship Program; “independent choice” trumped “no aid separationism.” The Court opinion
treats the matter, however, as if it were solely a question of choosing the applicable precedents,
rather than resolving a fundamental conflict in the prior law. The primary virtue of the majority
opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, resides in the fact that it is a majority opinion, in
contrast to the fragmented decision in Mitchell v. Helms. Justices O’Connor and Thomas wrote
concurring opinions, while Justices Souter, Breyer, and Stevens authored dissents.39
1. The Court Opinion (Chief Justice Rehnquist)
An opinion of the Supreme Court, or indeed of any appellate court, should fulfill a
number of functions, but at least two of these are central. First, the opinion should provide
guidance that is sufficiently clear to enable lawyers and lower court judges to make decisions in
future, relevantly similar cases. Second, the opinion should make a reasonable attempt to justify
the court’s decision as something more principled than judicial fiat.40 The Zelman majority
opinion succeeds in the first task, but falls far short in the second.
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All four dissenters, including Justice Ginsburg, joined Justice Souter’s dissent. Justices
Stevens and Souter, but not Justice Ginsburg, joined Justice Breyer’s dissent, and Justice Stevens
– who had joined the other two dissents – wrote his dissent for himself only.
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a) The bright line of private choice
From the beginning of his analysis, the Chief Justice moved to ground familiar even to
those only casually acquainted with the Byzantine turns of Establishment Clause jurisprudence –
the Lemon test, or at least the two parts remaining after Agostini v. Felton.41 Lemon’s first
prong, the requirement that the challenged program must have a secular purpose, took the Court
but a single sentence to dispatch: “There is no dispute that the program challenged here was
enacted for the valid secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor children in a
demonstrably failing public school system.”42 The second inquiry – whether the challenged
program has the “primary effect” of “advancing or inhibiting” religion – proved the more
challenging. With respect to the “effects” test, the Court identified a sharp distinction in
Establishment Clause law between programs of direct aid to religious schools and indirect aid,
defined as “programs of true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools
only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals.”43 Although direct
aid cases have blazed the erratic trail of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court declared
that indirect aid cases stand in a “consistent and unbroken” line, in which the Court has
considered three “true private choice programs” and upheld them all.44
Thus, for the majority, the main question to be answered was whether or not the Ohio
Pilot Scholarship Program constituted indirect aid. To answer that question, the Court identified

41
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Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
Zelman, slip op. at 7.

43

Id.

44

Id.
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three criteria present in the earlier indirect aid cases. As a threshold requirement, the aid program
must be “neutral in all respects toward religion.”45 By this, the Court simply means formal
neutrality – the classes of both the participating schools and the eligible students must be defined
in non-religious terms. Because the Cleveland program was open to any private school in the
district and any public school in the adjacent districts, and the only preferred students are those
who come from lower income families, the Court found this criteria satisfied in Zelman.46
Next, the program must provide aid “directly to a broad class of individuals, defined
without reference to religion.”47 This criterion, which originated in Mueller v. Allen,48 ensures
that the formal neutrality required by the first criterion does not in fact represent a gerrymander in
favor of a particular religious group; the more dispersed the benefits, the less likely any one
religious group would be considered the intended beneficiary of government largesse. The
Cleveland voucher scheme was open to “any parent of a school-age child who resides in the
Cleveland City School District,”49 which represented a beneficiary class sufficiently broad to
meet this standard.
Although criteria concerning program neutrality were enough to satisfy four of the
Justices in the majority, these standards do not in and of themselves make the aid indirect, so the
Court’s final inquiry turns out to be the dispositive one in maintaining a majority. The aid

45

Id. at 11.
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Id.

47

Id.

48

Mueller at 397.

49

Zelman, slip op. at 11.
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recipients must be “empowered to direct the aid to schools or institutions of their own
choosing.”50 The Court found that the Cleveland program offered parents a wide array of
options: “They may remain in public school as before, remain in public school with publicly
funded tutoring aid, obtain a scholarship and choose a religious school, obtain a scholarship and
choose a nonreligious school, enroll in a community school, or enroll in a magnet school.”51
Taken together, these criteria comprise the court’s image of legitimate indirect aid
programs as “circuit breakers” between the government and religious institutions. If government
has acted neutrally in establishing the program – by defining the providers and beneficiaries
without respect to religious – and if the beneficiaries determine the provider they will use, then
government is constitutionally disconnected from any religious provider that a given beneficiary
might choose.
Through its articulation of this “circuit breaker” image, the Court has provided stark and
well-defined answers to three of the fundamental constitutional questions concerning voucher
plans for primary and secondary education:
i. Does the voucher form of financing have constitutional significance? Whether or not
Chief Justice Rehnquist simply used the sharp distinction between direct and indirect financing
to ensure that Justice O’Connor joined in the majority opinion, a bright line now has been
enshrined in the law of the Establishment Clause. The majority recites the mantra of “true
private choice” no less than fifteen times in a relatively short opinion;52 in the heart of its
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Id.

51

Id. at 14.

52

Slip op. at [list places].
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analysis, the majority uses this refrain to close nearly every paragraph. “Private choice” serves as
the majority’s answer to two critiques advanced by the dissenters, who claimed that the
percentage of available voucher seats located in religious schools, and the overall amount of
government money flowing to religious schools, should determine the constitutionality of a given
program.
To both challenges, the majority provides the same answer: because of the intervening
private choice exercised by beneficiaries (within a neutral program), the government is not
responsible for the amount of money that ends up with religious institutions, nor is the
government responsible for the percentage of students who choose seats in religious schools, or
even the percentage of seats open to voucher students that are found in religious schools. Each
of those statistics is created by demographic forces or choices, either personal or institutional,
outside the government’s control and responsibility. 53
ii. How should the relevant universe of choices be defined? This question turned out to
be absolutely central to the disposition of the case. The Court’s decisions in Mueller, Witters,
and Zobrest signaled the importance of private choice for Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
but the cases left wide open the question of how to measure the range of available choices.
Presumably, a “choice” program that leaves beneficiaries with only one choice, and a religious
one at that, would not qualify as a “genuine choice” between secular and religious options.
Mueller, however, involved a tax deduction rather than a transfer to the a religious institution,
and Witters and Zobrest involved programs that offered virtually unlimited choices. In Witters,
the voucher program allowed recipients to choose any school or program offering vocational
53

Id. at 14.
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training in virtually any field.54 The program at issue in Zobrest entitled hearing-impaired
students to the assistance of government-financed sign-language interpreters at any school they
attended, public or private, secular or religious.55 In neither of these cases did religious schools
make up a significant portion of the available choices.
In contrast, the Ohio Scholarship program offered parents a considerably narrower range
of choices. On its face, the program offered three options: vouchers for use at public schools in
adjacent districts; vouchers to pay for private tutoring services for students remaining in
Cleveland public schools; and vouchers for use at private schools in Cleveland.56 The first option
was illusory – no public school district in the Cleveland metropolitan area agreed to take
Cleveland voucher students.57 The second option could hardly count as an equal alternative to
private school tuition; the tutoring voucher offered a maximum of $360, or approximately $10 a
week for the school year. Religious schools dominated the third option; they offered nearly 97%
of the voucher seats in the 1999-2000 academic year.
The Court rejected such a narrow construction of the choices available to Cleveland
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Witters, 474 U.S. at 487-89. Washington State excluded only religious training
programs from its funding, and asserted that the Establishment Clause required such an
exclusion; the Court held that it does not – although the Washington Supreme Court later held
that the state constitution’s religion clause did bar state payments for religious training. The
Washington Supreme Court’s ruling has lately come under federal constitutional attack in Davey
v. Locke. See supra notes xx-xx and accompanying text.
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Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10-12. Like Witters, Zobrest involved a claim by program
administrators that the Establishment Clause barred the use of program funds to support religious
education, and again the Court held that it does not.
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parents. In a voucher program, the Court held, the relevant range of options should not be
restricted to the options created by the challenged program. Instead, the Court said that the range
should be measured
....from the perspective of Cleveland parents looking to choose the best
educational option for their school-age children. Parents who choose a [voucher]
program school in fact receive from the State precisely what parents who choose a
community or magnet school receive – the opportunity to send their children
largely at state expense to schools they prefer to their local public school.58
Seen in that context, voucher seats in religious schools account for a much smaller portion of the
state-financed educational alternatives.59 The majority’s analysis of this point, unlike Justice
O’Connor’s, does not focus on the subjective experience of parents choosing schools.60 Although
it refers to the “perspective of Cleveland parents,” the Court adopts an objective determinant for
the range of choices, measured by the extent of Ohio’s overall public support for education. “All
options Ohio provides schoolchildren”61 count as relevant choices from which parents may
select.
iii. Who holds the burden of persuasion as to the “genuine and independent” nature of
the voucher recipient’s choice? The Court’s answers to the first two questions clarify most
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Id. at 19, n.6. The Court expressed deep frustration at oral arguments that those who
challenged the program – and the 6th Circuit – would not explain why community and magnet
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Establishment Clause questions about the importance and relevant scope of beneficiary choice,
but they do not directly address the significance of the various adjectives modifying “private
choice,” which include “genuine,” “independent,” and “true.” The Court provides a subtle, but
telling, response to this issue: “There ... is no evidence that the program fails to provide genuine
opportunities for Cleveland parents to select secular educational options for their school-age
children.”62 At first glance, it appears that the Court has simply indicated that those who
challenge a voucher program on Establishment Clause grounds have the burden of showing that
the state has failed to make available “genuine” choices to the parents making the selection.
While that conclusion is no doubt correct – and represents an important part of Zelman’s
legacy – the quote reinforces a deeper insight about the Court’s understanding of “genuine
choice.” “Genuine” modifies not the parents’ act of choosing, but rather the choices made
available to them by the state. Although public schools in the surrounding district do not
contribute to genuine choice – no seats were ever available in such schools – community and
magnet schools did have seats available, and those schools, whatever their academic merits,
count as “genuine choices” under the Court’s analysis. As in its understanding of the range of
available choices, the Court declines to inquire into parents’ subjective experiences in selecting
schools for their children. Parents might prefer School A over School B on grounds of academic
quality, value emphasis, and/or physical safety, but prefer B over A because of the religious
teaching at A. Parents in such circumstances are squeezed by the set of trade-offs presented to
them. The comparative quality or safety of the various schools may generate pressure on parents
to send their children to religious schools, calling into question the “genuineness” of their choice
62

Id. at 13.
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of a particular religious element to their child’s education. The Court’s opinion, however,
evinces no concern for their plight.63
The majority’s opinion thus provides clear direction for lawyers and judges in future
controversies over school vouchers, and a simple roadmap for legislators contemplating the
design of voucher programs. If a program is enacted for a secular purpose, defines the classes of
schools and students in religion-neutral terms, offers benefits to a broad set of students, and
offers those students a variety of publicly-financed options – potentially including the
neighborhood public school – the program will survive any challenge under the Establishment
Clause.
Analyzing voucher plans in circumstances other than Cleveland’s reinforces our sense of
Zelman’s clarity and scope. Consider, for a real example, the Florida Opportunity Scholarship
Program.64 The Program authorizes the payment of scholarships to the families of children
whose public schools fail for two years in any four-year period to pass state-wide tests of
minimum adequacy.65 Recipients of these scholarships may use them at any nonfailing public
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Indeed, the only indication that the Court has considered the state’s actual influence on
parental choice reveals the majority’s attitude toward any subjective inquiry. “The Establishment
Clause question is whether Ohio is coercing parents into sending their children to religious
schools....” Id at 14. Defined this narrowly – in terms of coercion, rather than influence – the
answer is obviously no.
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Florida Statutes, sec. 229.0537(3). A county-level court has recently ruled the program
to be a violation of the state constitution. Holmes v. Bush, Second Judicial Circuit, Leon Cty,
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infra.
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Many details of the Florida program are available at the website
www.schoolchoiceinfo.org. The particulars of the state-wide testing system, which focuses on
reading, writing, and mathematics, and is administered by the state Department of Education, can
be located at www.floridachild.org/aaschoolgrading.html. To fail, a school must fall below pre21

school in their own district; at a nonfailing public school, if seats are open, in an adjacent school
district,66 or at any participating private school. Thus far, the Florida Department of Education
has certified a very small number of schools to have failed for two years.67
Given this program design and testing results, the Florida program sails over Zelman’s
Establishment Clause hurdle. The premise of the program is that schools must be tested for
adequacy, and that Florida parents whose children attend schools that have twice failed to meet
state standards must be given exit options. But the number of twice-failing schools is tiny, and
parents of children in them may choose from a broad array of not-failing public schools, perhaps
including those in districts other their own, and participating private schools, not all of which are
religious. The schools must accept voucher students on a random and religion-neutral basis,
giving no weight to the applicant’s academic history. On these facts, there can be little doubt that
Zelman’s requirements that parental choices of school be “genuine” and “independent,” and that
parents not be coerced into sending their children to religious schools, are satisfied. The premise
of the Cleveland program is that the entire system of neighborhood public schools is flawed, and
that parents should be empowered to escape it. Florida’s premise is far narrower; some particular
schools are “failing,” and if they cannot improve sufficiently, parents should be able to move

set criteria in all three academic areas. Only 78 schools failed the first set of Florida tests,
http://edworkforce.house.gov/hearings/106th/oi/tampa32700/gallagher.html (testimony of
Florida Education Commissioner before a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives),
and of these, only two failed a second consecutive year.
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James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 Yale
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their children – and the state’s support associated with those children68 – to a school that is not
“failing.”
What if a community with very good public schools decides to create a voucher program,
in which religious schools may participate? First, we note that this presents a situation in which
the political likelihood of a voucher plan being enacted is probably close to zero. Most excellent
public school systems in the United States are in affluent suburbs, which tend to have the will
and the resources to support high quality public schools. The political motivation that ordinarily
fuels voucher talk is completely missing from such a jurisdiction; indeed, one would expect
opposition from supporters of the public system to be extremely high. Unless challengers can
demonstrate that a voucher program is motivated by a governmental intent to help sectarian
schools or religious families, rather than promote competition among all schools and facilitate
religion-neutral parental choice, the constitutionality of a voucher plan in such a jurisdiction is
completely assured; parents in this hypothetical jurisdiction have ample and rich secular, public
choices. The overriding lesson of Zelman is that every school option, public and private, is part
of the relevant choice menu. Thus, even if every private option was religious in character, a
voucher plan in such a setting would pass Establishment Clause muster.
Paradoxically, given the policy impetus for school vouchers, the most difficult context in
which to defend the constitutionality of a voucher plan involves a jurisdiction with dismal public
schools, and no innovation in place either to improve them, or offer new, public alternatives, as
Cleveland had done. In such a community, a plan that involved an overwhelming majority of
68

If a child exits a failing school with an opportunity scholarship, the school he or she
leaves behind loses an amount of state budget support equivalent to the amount of the
scholarship. Fla. Stat. Sec. 229.0537(3), section 6.
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religious private schools among the participating private schools would create the maximum
incentive – approaching coercion as the public schools deteriorated further – for parents to select
religious schools for their children.
It is not clear from Zelman whether such a program would be constitutionally acceptable.
The Court opinion does mention the neighborhood public schools as being among the relevant
options,69 but it’s only one of several, and the facts are sufficiently different from our
hypothetical that one cannot be sure of the outcome.70 We very much doubt, however, whether a
voucher program in such an educationally dismal place will ever come to be. First of all, a
system that bad would be under tremendous political pressure, from within and without, to
improve its public offerings. Second, recent federal legislation – the “No Child Left Behind
Act”71 – creates financial incentives for states and localities to make precisely the sort of
innovations that Cleveland had employed. In Zelman, those innovations played a central part in
the Court’s rationale, and some version of them is likely to appear everywhere prior to the
enactment of a voucher program.
b) The failure to justify the principle of choice
Clarity and simplicity should be counted among the virtues of the majority’s opinion, but
normative justification is hard to find. The Court identifies Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest as
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The ultimate conclusion on this question may reside in the short run in whether Justice
O’Connor would join in an opinion to uphold such a program.. We have our doubts about that.
See TAN xx infra.
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controlling precedent, draws from them “the principle of private choice,” and concludes that the
Ohio Scholarship scheme qualifies as a program of private choice, thus ending the constitutional
inquiry. Despite repeatedly invoking the mantra of “genuine private choice,” the majority never
explains why a recipient’s intervening choice dissolves the Establishment Clause concerns that
typically attend unrestricted transfers of public funds to religious institutions. Why is indirect aid
not just a form of “money laundering,”72 as the dissenters claim?
Any answer to that question depends on prior judgments about the meaning and purpose
of the Establishment Clause, though the Zelman opinion is silent about such judgments. The
majority’s lack of a theoretical foundation for the principle of private choice may be simply a
reflection of the Chief Justice’s style, or a reflection of an uneasy relationship between Justice
O’Connor and the four Justices who joined in the Mitchell v. Helms plurality. For those four,
private choice is unnecessary to establish the constitutionality of the program – secular purpose
and formal neutrality do all the work.
Nevertheless, a glimpse at the underlying commitments of the Zelman majority can be
discerned from the Court’s treatment of the precedents for its “principle of private choice.” In its
discussion of Mueller, the Court says that private choice “ensure[s] that ‘no imprimatur of state
approval’ can be deemed to have been conferred on any particular religion, or on religion
generally.”73 Summarizing Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, the Court contends that in a program
of indirect aid, “The incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement
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of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the
government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits.”74 The “reasonable observer”
sees the state provide benefits to a broad class of individuals, and then sees the beneficiaries use
the state’s funds to receive services from a range of providers, both religious and nonreligious.
For the reasonable observer, according to the majority’s analysis, the state’s attitude toward
payments to religious providers is one of benign indifference, not endorsement.
The Court’s focus on endorsement – a concept far better suited to analysis of cases
involving religious expression by the government – can be attributed at least in part to the
attention the parties in Zelman gave to the concept. Both sides perceived that Justice O’Connor
represented the swing vote, and she has long been associated with the endorsement test.75 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, however, reframed the endorsement analysis, and thus the significance of
private choice, to match the plurality’s reasoning in Mitchell v. Helms. In Mitchell, the plurality
collapsed Lemon’s effects test into the single criterion of neutrality.
If the religious, irreligious, and a religious are all alike eligible for government
aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient
conducts has been done at the behest of the government. For attribution of
indoctrination is a relative question. If the government is offering assistance to
recipients who provide, so to speak, a broad range of indoctrination, the
government is not itself thought responsible for any particular indoctrination. To
put the point differently, if the government, seeking to further some legitimate
secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all
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See TAN xx supra. Add cites to Zelman briefs; see also David Cole, Faith and
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who adequately furthered that purpose, then it is fair to say that any aid going to a
religious recipient only has the effect of furthering that secular purpose.76
Thus, for the Mitchell plurality – four of the five Justices in the Zelman majority – the
Establishment Clause is offended when the government acts with the intent to advance some or
all religions, or would be perceived by a reasonable observer to have acted with that intent.
Absent such a finding of intent to advance religion over its secular counterpart, the state should
not be deemed responsible for any religious indoctrination that accompanies state-financed
services provided by religious entities.
This emphasis on neutrality and intentionality, rather than on the foreseeable effects of
the voucher program in steering some families in the direction of religious education, is most
visible in the Court’s attempt to distinguish the holding of Committee for Public Ed. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist. The Court referred to the “ostensibly secular purposes” offered to support the
program of tuition grants and tax credits,77 and focused on the underlying legislative motive for
enacting the program, which was determined to be the “increasingly grave fiscal problems”
facing private religious schools.78 This impermissible motive was manifest in the “package of
benefits” given “exclusively to private schools and the parents of private school enrollees.”79 In
contrast, the Cleveland voucher plan had emerged from a long – and religion-neutral – history of
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public school failure and the state’s enactment of a wide array of programs designed to address
that failure. The “history and context” of the Ohio Scholarship Program, of which the reasonable
observer is necessarily aware, should convince anyone that the government acted with religionneutral intent.80
By collapsing the Establishment Clause inquiry into whether or not the government acted,
or was reasonably perceived to have acted, with religion-neutral intent, the Court (or more
properly, the Mitchell plurality) has in fact limited considerably the independent significance of
“genuine choice.” The first two criteria of the Lemon effects test – religion-neutral classification
of providers and beneficiaries, broad distribution of benefits – provide the necessary scrutiny of
the government’s bona fides. Any program that meets those two requirements will likely be
perceived as religion-neutral in its intent.81 The beneficiary’s private choice simply reconfirms
what was already established, i.e., that the government should not be imputed responsibility for
religious indoctrination the beneficiary receives with the voucher financing.
This theoretical foundation for the Court’s opinion faces one inescapable problem: Justice
O’Connor, in her concurring opinion in Mitchell, specifically rejected the plurality’s attempt to
reduce Establishment Clause analysis to the neutral-intent inquiry.82 Because the intervening
private choice was decisive for Justice O’Connor, and the majority needed her to join in order to
maintain a unified Court opinion, the Chief Justice needed to highlight the importance of private
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choice. The compromise obviously left Chief Justice Rehnquist in a difficult position. To
articulate an Establishment Clause theory that really turned on “genuine and independent
choice,” he would need to limit significantly the neutral-intent analysis advanced in Mitchell, and
perhaps risk losing the votes of other members of the majority. If he ignored or downplayed the
criteria of private choice, the Chief Justice would risk losing Justice O’Connor from the majority.
The resulting majority opinion demonstrates the Chief Justice’s balancing act: The concept of
“[g]enuine and independent choice” takes center stage, but in no way limits the Mitchell
plurality’s approach to the Establishment Clause. In cases of direct funding, just as in
arrangements involving private choice, these four Justices will remain willing to uphold aid
programs so long as government does not intend to prefer religious institutions to nonreligious
institutions.
2. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence.
From the time the Court granted certiorari in Zelman, observers generally agreed
that Justice O’Connor’s vote would be decisive in the case.83 Parties and amici wrote briefs
designed to attract her attention, typically focusing their arguments on the endorsement test that
O’Connor first articulated, and to which she frequently returns in Establishment Clause cases.84
Once the case was handed down, most commentators focused not on what O’Connor said, but
what she didn’t say or do. Unlike in Mitchell, O’Connor’s concurrence in Zelman seems to
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impose no constraints on the Court’s decision.85 A closer reading, however, reveals subtle
differences between her concurrence and the majority opinion, differences that could prove
significant for the future of indirect aid cases.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion starts with a curious and wide-ranging survey of government
programs that provide indirect, unrestricted support for religious institutions.86 Her ostensible
purpose for this inquiry is to show that “the support that the Cleveland voucher program provides
religious institutions is neither substantial nor atypical of existing government programs.”87 The
effect of this long catalogue is even broader; it shows that the dissenters’ account of no-aid
separationism was always a chimera in practice, and is now a dinosaur in theory.
The second and third parts of her opinion prove to be the more significant. At first
glance, Justice O’Connor seems to have simply restated the Court’s analysis. She emphasized
Zelman’s continuity with earlier Establishment Clause decisions; the significance of “genuine
and independent choice”;88 the need to consider “all the choices available to potential
beneficiaries”;89 and the evidentiary burden placed on those who would challenge a voucher
program to show lack of “genuine choice.”90 In several important respects, however, Justice
O’Connor’s restatement of the Court’s analysis reveals important differences between her

85

News commentary, including our own piece in The Legal Times.

86

Zelman, slip opinion at ** (O’Connor, J., concurring)

87

Id. at xx.

88

Id. at xx.

89

Id. at xx.

90

Id. at xx.
30

understanding of the Establishment Clause and that shared by the other four members of the
Zelman majority.
The first such difference emerges in her response to Justice Souter’s claim that the Ohio
Scholarship program failed to provide Cleveland parents with “reasonable secular alternatives.”
Justice O’Connor replied: “For nonreligious schools to qualify as genuine options for parents,
they need not be superior to religious schools in every respect. They need only be adequate
substitutes for religious schools in the eyes of parents.”91 The test seems hopelessly superficial.
No one claimed that nonreligious schools “need .. to be superior to religious schools in very
respect”; and the consumer choice model of reasonable alternatives appears to be no more than a
truism – because parents send their children to a school, they must find it a reasonable
alternative. In her discussion of the test, however, Justice O’Connor demonstrated her distance
from the Court’s formality. Where the Court met the dissents’ objections by reciting case law
and the structure of Ohio’s programs, Justice O’Connor shifted attention to the parents of
Cleveland schoolchildren and their experience of school choice. Against Justice Souter’s claim
that few of the community schools should count as “reasonable alternatives” because of low test
scores, Justice O’Connor pointed to the high levels of parental satisfaction at those schools, the
possibility that parents may be attracted not just by test scores but by discipline and safety for
their children, and the fact that the community schools in question served among the “poorest
and most educationally disadvantaged students.”92
The shift in focus is also evident as Justice O’Connor turned to the majority’s placement

91

Id. at xx.

92

Id. at xx (citing J. Greene, et. al., Lessons from the Cleveland Scholarship Program).
31

of the evidentiary burden and explained how the presumption of genuine choice can be
overcome. “[T]here is no record evidence that any voucher-eligible student was turned away
from a nonreligious private school in the voucher program, let alone a community or magnet
school.”93 Contrast this statement of the burden of persuasion with that of the Court. The Court
found that the challengers provided “no evidence that the State deliberately skewed incentives
toward religious schools.”94 The Zelman majority would seem to find a violation only on proof
that the state intended to steer children into religious education, but Justice O’Connor measured
the effect of the program on Cleveland parents and schoolchildren, and asked whether secular
options were in fact open or closed to voucher recipients.
An even more subtle distinction further demonstrates Justice O’Connor’s divergence
from the other members of the Zelman majority. Restating the Court’s test for “genuine and
independent choice,” Justice O’Connor said that the criteria “requires that state aid flowing to
religious organizations through the hands of beneficiaries must do so only at the direction of
those beneficiaries.”95 Most of the statement parallels the Court’s mantra of “true private
choice,” except for the specification that the aid must flow “through the hands of beneficiaries.”
Though unimportant for the decision in Zelman – because the tuition vouchers were made
payable to parents, who then endorsed the checks over to the schools – this distinction was part
of what separated Justice O’Connor from the plurality in Mitchell. The plurality identified the
program at issue in Mitchell as one of ‘virtual’ private choice because schools received the
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government support on a per capita basis -- the amount of government aid was determined by the
number of students enrolled at each school.
Justice O’Connor, however, drew a sharp distinction between the “true private choice”
programs at issue in Witters and Zobrest, and the per capita aid program considered in Mitchell.96
In Mitchell, Justice O’Connor offered three justifications for her refusal to equate per capita aid
programs with those involving “true private choice.” First, she claimed that per capita aid
programs are more likely to be perceived as governmental “endorsements” of the institutions
receiving aid. The claim, however, proves nothing more than an assertion: “The [per capita] aid
formula does not – and could not – indicate to a reasonable observer that the inculcation of
religion is endorsed only by the individuals attending the religious school.”97 The statement
reveals more about the elasticity of the endorsement test than it does about the program in
question. Why would a reasonable observer not perceive that the state’s aid is wholly dependent
on actual student enrollment in the school, and thus is disconnected from any independent (and
presumably illegitimate) intention of the state to finance the school?
Second, Justice O’Connor argued that collapsing private choice and per capita aid
programs -- especially those involving cash transfers -- leads to a slippery slope, potentially
ending in “direct money payments to religious organizations (including churches) based on the
number of persons belonging to each organization.”98 Although the Mitchell plurality’s analysis
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could be construed to justify such grants to religious organizations, it is hard to see how the
distinction between “true” and “virtual” private choice programs is material to this slippery
slope. What difference would it make if government aid for religious organizations was
distributed in the form of vouchers paid to individuals, who could then redeem the vouchers at
the religious institution of their choice? Whether it used “true” or “virtual” private choice, the
government would still need to establish a legitimate secular purpose for the aid, and show that
the aid was distributed through religion-neutral categories. The fact that aid passed “through the
hands of beneficiaries” seems hardly relevant to whether the state could finance the specifically
religious activities of religious organizations.
The only plausible justification is found in Justice O’Connor’s third ground for
distinguishing per capita aid from private choice programs.
[W]hen the government provides aid directly to the student beneficiary, that
student can attend a religious school and yet retain control over whether the
secular government aid will be applied toward the religious education. The fact
that aid flows to the religious school and is used for the advancement of religion is
therefore wholly dependent on the student’s private decision.
Control is demonstrated by the beneficiary’s freedom to attend the school and yet refuse the
state’s payment for her education; per capita aid programs deprive the beneficiary of that control.
Justice O’Connor’s emphasis on the beneficiary’s power to refuse the transfer of government
funds to a chosen service provider can be traced back to an analogy first introduced in Witters.
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall said “a State may issue a paycheck to one of its
employees, who may then donate all or part of that paycheck to a religious institution, all without
constitutional barrier; and the State may do so even knowing that the employee so intends to
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dispose of his salary.”99 The paradigmatic case of the donated paycheck offers several important
features. The government transfers ownership of the money to the beneficiary, and retains only
those controls over its use that apply to anyone’s use of money – e.g., criminal prohibitions on
the purchase of illegal drugs. The transfer is made in cash, leaving the beneficiary with a
virtually unlimited realm of options for spending or saving the money. In short, the government
employee enjoys control over the money and its disposition, and it is this experience of control
that Justice O’Connor’s analysis tries to capture.
The emphasis on the beneficiary’s experience of control relates directly to the other
points at which Justice O’Connor diverged from the Court’s opinion in Zelman. At nearly every
important point in the Court’s analysis – from the definition of the standard for “genuine choice”
to the tests for “reasonable secular alternatives” and the evidentiary burden on challengers –
Justice O’Connor directs attention to the actual experiences of parents in the Cleveland voucher
program, while the Court maintains a detached and formalist focus on the structure of the state’s
program. For Justice O’Connor, a program of “genuine and independent private choice” depends
on the experienced and practical – not hypothetical – freedom of beneficiaries to select between
religious and nonreligious providers. Such freedom ensures that beneficiaries have not been
intentionally directed by the state into religious education, which is the primary concern in the
Court’s analysis, and it guarantees as well that they have not been channeled into religious
education because of administrative indifference, or because of a set of options which precludes a
realistic choice of a secular provider.
99
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This interpretation of the contrast between the Court’s decision and Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence leads us to conclude that Justice O’Connor is the only member of the Court who
thinks that “genuine and independent choice” has determinative constitutional significance. The
four dissenting Justices largely reject the concept of recipient choice, believing it to be a matter
of form and not substance, and continue to assert “no-aid Separationism.” The four members of
the Mitchell plurality subsume beneficiary choice under the general idea of religion-neutrality;
for these Justices, beneficiary choice provides evidence of the government’s proper intention,
but has no independent significance. Nevertheless, the Zelman decision has enshrined the
concept of “true private choice” in the law of the Establishment Clause, though neither the
Court’s opinion nor Justice O’Connor’s provides adequate justification for the concept.100
We think that Justice O’Connor’s concern for the beneficiary’s experience of choice
represents the correct focus for constitutional analysis of voucher programs, and provides a key
to the principled justification of beneficiary choice. Her demand that aid must pass “through the
hands of beneficiaries,” however, proves to be an awkward proxy for advancing that concern. A
sounder approach to addressing that concern requires that we step back and examine the core
vices with which the Establishment Clause is concerned.
Some ground-clearing is needed before we turn to those vices. The Establishment Clause
does not protect against violations of taxpayer conscience caused by government support for
religious institutions. Justice O’Connor’s long catalogue of government support for religion

100

With respect to the majority’s opinion, the failure to justify the centrality of beneficiary
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makes clear the extent to which such support is a normal part of contemporary and historical
practice. In addition, there is no principled reason why the consciences of taxpayers with respect
to religious matters should enjoy constitutional preference over the consciences of taxpayers with
respect to nonreligious matters, such as support for weapons, sex education, or art. Nor does the
Establishment Clause protect religious institutions from becoming slothful through dependence
on government support. Why should the indolence or energy of religious institutions be a
legitimate matter for government concern – or, at least, any more a matter of concern than the
indolence of nonreligious voluntary associations? Nor does the Establishment Clause primarily
act as a safeguard against religious strife. Despite the extensive pattern of support documented
by Justice O’Connor, such strife has not been a significant part of our history, and certainly has
been overshadowed by other sources of conflict.
The Establishment Clause, however, does guard against a core vice – the government’s
assertion of control over, or competence in, matters of religion. Cases involving governmentsponsored religious speech or expression provide clear examples of this vice, and the Court has
continued to hold unconstitutional such acts of speech or expression.101 Direct financing of
religious activity also represents a clear example of the vice, partly because of the government’s
advancement of religious ends, and partly because of the government control that inevitably
accompanies such financing.102
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For further discussion of this point in the context of historic preservation, see Ira C.
Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to Houses of Worship: A Case Study in
the Survival of Separationism, 43 B.C. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming, 2002)..
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Moreover, the Establishment Clause’s concern extends beyond the government’s direct
and intentional engagement in religious activities. Since Abington School District v.
Schemmp,103 a case involving Bible reading in public schools, the Court has asked whether a
challenged program had the “primary effect”104 of advancing or inhibiting religion, not just
whether government intended to advance or inhibit religion. The question of forbidden effects
has remained at the forefront of Establishment Clause jurisprudence ever since the Schemmp
case, and the Zelman Court acknowledges the centrality of this concern, even as it focuses almost
exclusively on the neutrality of Ohio’s intent in structuring the voucher program.105 At its most
basic, the analysis of primary effects measures the “obvious and foreseeable religious
consequences of state policy,” and in particular “the effects on the targets or recipients” of
government programs or actions.106 Seen in this light, judicial examination of effects proceeds
from a rather ordinary legal principle: one can be held responsible for certain foreseeable
consequences of one’s actions, whether or not the consequences were intended.107 The chief
difficulty lies in determining the circumstances under which one should be held responsible.
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Justice O’Connor’s analysis in Zelman shows some degree of awareness of the
unintended but foreseeable consequences of the Ohio Scholarship program. Her attention to the
actual experiences of parents and schoolchildren under the program demonstrates a concern that
children enrolled in religious schools are there because of the “genuine and independent choices”
of their parents, not because of pressures for which the state should be held responsible. Justice
O’Connor’s focus on whether or not the money passes through the beneficiary’s hands, however,
offers little protection for her chief concern. It would be easy to design a program that used the
same financing mechanism as Cleveland’s – that is, the check goes first to the parent and is then
endorsed over to the school – but offered fewer and less attractive secular alternatives. The
financing mechanism alone might turn out to be nothing other than what the dissent believes it to
be, pure form without substance. We believe that Justice O’Connor’s concerns would have been
better served if she had articulated them more directly, and adopted a test that measured whether
or not the state was, in fact, exerting practical pressures on Cleveland parents to send their
children to religious schools.
In an earlier article, we suggested just such a test, one that focused on the extent to which
the state steered families toward religious experience, and the extent to which the state made
efforts to ameliorate pressures in that direction. Rather than focus on the actual mix of religious
and secular schools, which initially would be heavily influenced by the pre-existing
demographics of private education, we urged that courts impose an affirmative duty on the state
to take steps to improve the mix.108 In particular, we suggested that the Ohio voucher program
108

In our analysis, the precise nature of the state’s affirmative duty would vary relative to
the extent to which beneficiaries were required to avail themselves of a particular service (e.g.,
compulsory school attendance laws for minors or court-mandated substance abuse treatment) and
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could have required suburban public school systems to admit voucher students, mandated that
participating religious schools permit voucher students to opt out of worship and religious
education classes, and increased the voucher amount to attract additional private schools into the
program – measures successfully used in other voucher jurisdictions.109 We do not claim that our
approach is the only one responsive to these concerns. Justice O’Connor’s opinion would have
been much stronger, however, had she made such concerns explicit.
3. Justice Thomas’s concurrence.
Like Justice O’Connor, Justice Thomas joined the Court opinion but wrote separately and
alone as well. His concurrence highlights two major themes. First, he began and ended by
emphasizing the connection between Brown v. Board110 and Zelman.111 Brown had promised
equal educational opportunity for racial minority children in America, but the ghettoization of
many of these children in large urban centers where public schools have deteriorated has
undermined this promise.112 Justice Thomas reminded us quite eloquently of the ways in which
school voucher plans might help redeem the commitments made fifty years ago in Brown.
Second, Justice Thomas provocatively suggested that the Court’s decision in Everson v.
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Board of Education,113 which declared the Establishment Clause applicable to the states, should
be reconsidered. Justice Black’s opinion in for the Court in Everson had announced this
proposition without any careful inquiry,114 and none of the other Justices writing in Everson had
challenged him. Ever since, the Supreme Court has treated the question as entirely settled.115
Several commentators have strenuously questioned this conclusion as a historical and textual
matter,116 however, and Justice Thomas – consistent with his willingness to re-examine first
principles117 – urged that the Court limit its intervention into religious liberty issues arising under
state law to those properly cognizable under the Free Exercise Clause.118
This is not the place for us to confront head-on this challenge to a half-century’s
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understanding of the place of the Establishment Clause in American constitutional law.119 We
note, however, that Justice Thomas’s suggestion that states be left free to work out their own
church-state policy interacts in significant ways with the role of state constitutional law in postZelman litigation. Justice Thomas hints that free exercise values, but not pure non-Establishment
values, indeed limit the states, and the scope and content of that distinction may turn out to be of
considerable significance. We will take up that discussion in further detail in Part IIA, below.
4. The dissents.
a) Justice Souter. Justice Souter has for years been the Court’s most
active Separationist,120 and his Zelman opinion is consistent with that reputation. The longest of
all the Zelman opinions,121 it begins with a dramatic assertion that Zelman has effectively
dismantled Everson,122 the Court’s germinal Establishment Clause decision, and then proceeds in
three sections. Part I traces and attempts to synthesize all of the Court’s decisions about aid to
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concerns all buttress the application of Establishment Clause values to the states. See Lash in
Northwestern; Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against
Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 555 (1991).
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religious entities since Everson.123 Justice Souter concludes from this review that the Zelman
opinion marks the first time that the Court has ever 1) deemed irrelevant “the substantiality of the
aid,”124 or 2) “held purely formal criteria to suffice for scrutinizing aid that ends up in the coffers
of religious schools.”125 Part II argues that the Cleveland voucher program does not satisfy the
Court’s own criteria of neutrality and private choice,126 because, in Justice Souter’s view, the
relevant baseline for measuring both neutrality and private choice is the set of participating
private schools, most of which are religious, rather than the broader universe of all educational
options open to Cleveland parents. Finally, Part III argues that even if the program were neutral
and rested on independent private choice, it would still represent substantial aid to the religious
teaching function of sectarian schools and therefore violate the Establishment Clause.127 Here,
Justice Souter emphasizes the threat that government largesse of any kind may present to the
independence of a school’s religious mission,128 and the hazards of political divisiveness on
sectarian lines.129
The most complimentary thing we can say about Justice Souter is that he is true to his
longstanding convictions. Those convictions, however, stand in need of normative defense. Only
123
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if the reasons for barring the state from aiding religious instruction are persuasive, and only if
those reasons apply to a private choice program, is Justice Souter’s position fully defensible.
Had the Ohio program involved direct aid to religious schools, without any requirement that
public funds be spent only on secular instruction, we would find a number of Justice Souter’s
arguments quite appealing. The key question presented by Zelman, however, is whether a regime
of private choice should alter the constitutional calculus.130 In Part III, Justice Souter rejects the
idea that private choice, however structured or facilitated, can save the Cleveland program;
indeed, at the end of Part II, he concedes that a program of more substantial tuition grants, which
would have widened choice, would only exacerbate the problem with which he is concerned –
substantial state aid for the religious teaching function of sectarian schools.131
With respect to a direct aid program, the case for excluding state subsidy of religious
instruction must be rethought. As we argue above in our discussion of Justice O’Connor’s
opinion, the case does not rest on protecting the conscience of taxpayers, who may be frequently
compelled to support views from which they dissent. Nor does the case rest on the need to
ensure that religious institutions not become dependent on the state. In a complex and advanced
society, such entities will inevitably be deeply dependent on government – for police and fire
protection, for roads that will permit worshipers to attend prayer services, and for direct financial
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support of their charities that perform secularly valuable work,132 among other things.
The best argument for excluding the state from direct support of religious activity is the
importance of keeping the government out of the realm of the ultimate. The state may of course
adopt secular positions, and promote them, but it may not adopt an official view of religious
truth.. Moreover, if the state pays directly for the transmission of religious ideals for
instrumental reasons of shaping them – say, to encourage a certain view of public morality – it
will have incentives to be selective in the faiths it supports and to exercise control over such
teaching. This will put the state in the constitutionally impermissible position of choosing and
authoring religious faith. Our constitutional exclusion of the state from religious establishment,
and free exercise prohibition, is designed to limit the state to a secular jurisdiction, and to keep
the experience of faith in wholly private hands. At bottom, this arrangement is profoundly antitotalitarian; it reminds state officials as well as the citizenry that the state is temporal and limited,
and should not use faith “as an instrument of civil policy.”133
Whether this particular justification – to us, the only persuasive one – can be extended to
“private choice” arrangements is the very question put to the Court by the problem in Zelman.
Justice Souter, and the dissenters who join him, seem to us mired in now-antiquated and
unpersuasive theories of church-state separation.134 As a result, they were simply unwilling to
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confront the premises that led Justice O’Connor – alone among the Justices, thus far, and unable
to articulate fully a normative explanation of her view – to distinguish sharply in her
jurisprudence of nonestablishment between direct and indirect aid.
Unable to answer Justice O’Connor and the remainder of the majority on its terms, the
dissenters were content to parrot the arguments of voucher challengers on the nonneutrality of the
Cleveland program. Had the dissenters been willing to take the Court’s own premises at face
value – in particular, the argument that the public schooling options had to count in any appraisal
of whether the state was responsible for religious indoctrination of voucher students – they might
have had a chance of persuading Justice O’Connor, the crucial fifth vote, to their side. Instead,
their approach, like that of the challengers, doomed their project to failure – and, we expect,
ultimate disappearance from the constitutional canon – from the start.
b) Justice Breyer.135

Justice Souter’s dissent mentioned one additional

major argument from Separationism’s heyday – that substantial state assistance to religious
schools would lead to social and political strife. It remained, however, to Justice Breyer to
elaborate on this argument in ways that have not been seen in thirty years.
The argument that state aid to religious schools would foment political strife along
sectarian lines had very brief prominence in the decisional law dealing with state aid to religious
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46

entities. In Lemon v. Kurtzman136 and, again, two years later in Committee for Public Education
v. Nyquist,137 Supreme Court majorities relied on this as one of the arguments against the
constitutionality of programs that tended heavily to aid Catholic schools. With an eye on
contemporary Northern Ireland, and on European and American history of Protestant-Catholic
conflict, the Court in both cases cited the potential for such conflict as a reason to disfavor
programs calling for annual appropriations to a large group of private schools, most of which
were Catholic.
Except for cases involving government religious speech, however, this theme has been
heavily criticized and submerged for the past thirty years of constitutional adjudication. The
reasons for this submergence are not difficult to discern. Roe v. Wade138 – decided in the same
Term as Nyquist – quickly prompted the Justices to realize that a great many political issues, not
limited to aid to sectarian schools, might foment division on sectarian lines. This sort of division
also appears with respect to government policy on sexuality, reproduction, welfare, capital
punishment, and war, to mention but a few. A doctrine that impeded the enactment of policy
because of sectarian disagreement had no logical stopping place, and would effectively disable
government from responding to matters of great public importance.
The one context in which the concern for divisiveness has kept a small toehold is that of
government speech on religious issues. If, for example, public schools sponsor worship services
of any kind, there will have to be some political process to determine their content. Inevitably,

136

403 U.S. 602 (1971).

137

413 U.S. 756 (1973).

138

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
47

such processes, whether they be matters of administration for elected school boards,139 or
discretionary decisions by school administrators,140 or policy determinations officially delegated
to students,141 will result in worship choices made by some and imposed coercively on others. In
these circumstances, the prospect of political fights over the content of prayer echoes historical
concerns over state selection of articles of worship,142 although here, as was true in the 18th
century, the process concern is parasitic on the substantive worry about coercing religious
expression.
Whatever the contemporary persuasiveness of these arguments in the context of
government speech, however, they do not carry over well to the context of government transfers
to religious entities. The concept of neutrality, as Zelman advances it, is the key to this
distinction. Government cannot possibly be evenhanded among prayers or religious observances;
there is never time enough to worship in all possible ways, and it is impossible to imagine public
schools in today’s United States sponsoring daily prayers to Allah, or arranging cafeteria
protocols to fit the laws of Kashrut. By contrast, school voucher plans must be neutral among
faiths; Jewish, Buddhist, Muslim, Christian, and Secular Humanist schools – to name only a few
– must be offered equal opportunity to participate in voucher programs.
Justice Breyer’s dissent shows deep insensitivity to the history, limits, and failings of the
concern for “political divisiveness.” He recites a history of Protestant-Catholic tension in the
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U.S. that, if anything, should embarrass a Court that spawned the regime of no-aid Separationism
out of deeply anti-Catholic premises.143 He worries about attempts to suppress Islamic teaching
or other unpopular views in voucher schools, apparently without realizing the extent to which
this echoes 19th and 20th century concerns about public subsidy for Catholic schools teaching
their students that Protestants were damned. He asserts paternalistic concerns about faiths unable
or unwilling to mount schools of their own, and faiths likely to be the object of interference of
public authorities.
This horrible and speculative parade, once the staple of church-state opinions, now seems
hopelessly overbroad and rather out of touch with American political and cultural realities. If
state interference with religious teaching in fact accompanies voucher programs, we think the
Constitution is adequate to the task of blocking that interference.144 Despite the three votes it got
in Zelman, we think the prophylactic exclusion of religious entities from government support that
Justice Breyer’s dissent would require is a relic of a happily lost constitutional world. Indeed, we
think Justice Breyer’s view is cause, not cure, of social strife. The religious wars in the United
States in the early 21st century are not Protestant vs. Catholic, or Christian vs. Jew, or even the
more plausible Islam vs. all others. They are instead the wars of the deeply religious against the
forces of a relentlessly secular commercial culture.145 A doctrine that would permit the state to
support secular schools only, public or private, is likely to aggravate precisely the sort of conflict
with which Justice Breyer, and those who joined him, purport to be concerned.
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II. The Legal Horizon for Voucher Financing of Religious Providers
Unlike those landmark court decisions which terminate a government practice – de jure
racial segregation, or the criminalization of abortion, for example – Zelman is merely permissive.
It removes rather than creates a constitutional impediment to state policy. As such, its
significance in American life will turn very heavily on the political energies and legal phenomena
which emerge in its wake.
Others have analyzed in considerable detail the strong and determined forces that
contend over the future of American education, on issues of vouchers and otherwise.146 These
forces include, on the anti-voucher side, suburbanites determined to insulate their public school
systems from poorer urbanites;147 public school teacher unions;148 secular liberals committed to
preserving the identity-shaping mission of the common school;149 and others who fear that
voucher programs will drain resources from public schools. These groups are opposed by a
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coalition of urban parents, primarily African-American,150 who seek better options for their
children; ideological compatriots of Milton Friedman, the economist who originated the idea of
education vouchers as a way of stimulating competition among schools;151 and those who see
parental choice movements as the best way of promoting both fairness and educational
opportunity to less affluent families.152
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We cannot predict with any assurance the outcome of the political struggles that have
already begun to develop in Zelman’s aftermath.153 What we can say with confidence, however,
is that Zelman has removed only one of the legal impediments to voucher programs, and that
other barriers, including novel questions of state and federal law, remain. In this part, we
undertake the project of identifying and analyzing the legal questions most likely to appear in
Zelman’s wake. These include issues of state constitutional law, and its interaction with federal
constitutional law; the scope and permissibility of conditions that states may impose on service
providers in voucher programs, and the validity of exempting religious entities from such
conditions; and the questions likely to be spawned when voucher financing is utilized by
government to transfer resources to faith-intensive providers of services other than education.
A. State Constitutional Law and the Anti-Voucher Cause
To hear the anti-voucher litigators tell the story, they had all but given up on federal
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constitutional law as their stopper even before the Court handed down the Zelman opinion.154
Instead, their principal line of legal attack on educational voucher plans has shifted to reliance on
a variety of state constitutional restrictions on material transfers to religious institutions. Indeed,
in Florida, which has the only state-wide voucher program in the United States,155 the challengers
filed suit against the plan in state court and raised only state constitutional questions.
Florida’s constitution indeed provides ammunition to the anti-voucher side, but, as will
be elaborated below, Florida is far from unique. Florida’s constitution contains several clauses
that touch on the relationship between the state and religion or religious institutions. The first
sentence of Article I, section 3 of the state charter, in a near-mirroring of the First Amendment to
the federal constitution, provides that “There shall be no law respecting the establishment of
religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise thereof.” 156 The section proceeds,
however, with a section suggesting limits on religious freedom,157 and then adds the following : 158
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See, e.g. the remarks of a leading anti-voucher litigator Elliot Mincberg, General
Counsel, People for the American Way, at a Pew Forum panel held the day after Zelman:
First, while this is an important milestone, it is by no means the end of the legal road
because despite the fact that the Court has said that it is okay under the federal Constitution, there
are many, many state constitutions that have much more specific provisions in them that say that
taxpayer money shouldn't go to support religious institutions directly or indirectly.
http://pewforum.org/events/index.php?EventID=30; see also remarks of Robert Chanin, who
argued Zelma for the pro-voucher forces, in Wash Post/New York Times after Zelman
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Florida’s program provides vouchers only to students in public schools which fail
statewide measures of performance for two years within a period of four years. For more details,
see www.schoolchoiceinfo.org.
156

Florida Const. Art. I, sec. 3.

157

“Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public morals, peace
or safety.” Id.
158

Id.
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No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the
public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid
of any sectarian institution.
The Florida Constitution presents other impediments to the voucher plan as well,159 but
this last provision of Art. I, section 3, with its sweeping prohibition on taking revenue “from the
public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of . . . any sectarian institution” has from the outset
appeared to be a major impediment to a program that involves public financing of tuition at
religious schools. And, predictably enough, a Florida Circuit Court in early August, 2002, ruled
the Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program in violation of that provision.160 With no
suggestion that Zelman and its theory of intervening private choice might have any bearing on the
state law question, the Florida Circuit Court held that the voucher program could not be squared
with the blunt prohibition on using public revenue “directly or indirectly in aid of . . . any
sectarian institution.” As the Court put it,161
“To hold that this [mechanism of intervening private choice] avoids the constitutional
prohibition in Article I, [section] 3 would be the functional equivalent of redacting the word
‘indirectly’ from this phrase of the Constitution. . . . [S]uch an interpretation would amount to a
colossal triumph of form over substance.”

159

Art. IX, sec. 1; Art. IX, sec. 6. These provisions concern the state’s obligations to fund
the public schools, rather than any prohibition on aid to private, religious schools.
160

Holmes v. Bush, Second Judicial Circuit, Leon Cty, Florida, No. CV 99-3370, Aug. 5,
2002. Earlier claims that the program violated other provisions of the state constitution had
already been resolved in Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 768 (FL 1st DCA 2000), or had been
dismissed voluntarily. Holmes v. Bush, note 1. The court in Holmes v. Bush also announced,
with no supporting analysis, that any federal Establishment Clause claims had been “resolved” in
Zelman. Id.
161

Id. at 4 (citation omitted). A recent op-ed in The Tampa Tribune wondered explcitly
how the state legislature and the Governor had been willing to support the program in the face of
this constitutional language. Daniel Ruth, State School Voucher Scam Flunks Basic Civics Test,
reprinted at http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/news/article.cfm?id=78.
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This provision of the Florida Constitution is not unusual. As a number of scholars have
pointed out in recent years, somewhere between twenty and thirty state constitutions, depending
on the counting criteria, contain explicit provisions barring the use of public money at religious
schools or other religious institutions.162 These provisions have a common and troubled
historical provenance;163 virtually all of them seem to have been a product of Protestant-Catholic
conflict over education in the 19th and early 20th century. Catholics, many of whom were recent
immigrants, objected to the Protestant character of the public schools, and sought to change that
character and/or secure funding for their own schools. Protestants opposed both the change in
the public schools and the funding for a rival system of Catholic schools.
In 1875, at the height of this controversy, Republican Presidential aspirant James Blaine
introduced an amendment to the federal Constitution which would have explicitly forbidden any
state from authorizing lands or money devoted to public schools to be “under the control of any
religious sect,” or “divided between religious sects or denominations.”164 Although Blaine’s
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See Toby J. Heytens, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 Va. L. Rev. 117
(2000); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State
Constitutional Law, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 657 (1998); Eric Treene, "The Grand Finale is
Just the Beginning: School Choice and the Coming Battle Over Blaine Amendments.," available
at www.becketfund.org (hereafter, Treene, Grand Finale). The most comprehensive survey in the
field is Frank R. Kemerer , Ph.D., State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 Ed. Law Rep. 1.
The Kemerer piece includes the text of the relevant provisions, sorted into tables.
163

The best telling of this history is in Philip Hamburger’s important new book, The
Separation of Church and State, chaps. III-IV (Harvard, 2002).
164

In addition to Professor Hamburger’s recent book, sources on the Blaine Amendment
include Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 Amer. J. Leg. Hist. 38
(1992); Joseph P. Vitteriti, Choosing Equality 153 (1999); Nicole Stelle Garnett & Richard W.
Garnett, School Choice, the First Amendment, and Social Justice, 4 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 301,
337-38 (2000).
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efforts at the federal level failed, the cause he championed led to constitutional change in a
number of states, and influenced the drafting of constitutions for states that later entered the
Union.165 Because of Senator Blaine’s national influence over this movement, these state
provisions are now frequently referred to generically – especially by their enemies – as the
“Blaine Amendments.”
Some of the Blaine Amendments have been construed narrowly, and would now be no
impediment to a Cleveland-type school voucher program.166 Still others may yet be construed to
“mirror” the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the federal Establishment Clause.167 Moreover,
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Eric Treene argues that at least 6 states (New Mexico, Arizona, South Dakota, North
Dakota, Montana, and Washington) “were forced by Congress to enact such articles as a
condition of their admittance into the Union.” Treene, Grand Finale, note xx supra, at 8 & n.43.
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See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 624 (1999) (construing Blaine Amendment
narrowly because of its background of religious bigotry). Wisconsin’s Blaine Amendment did
not stop the Milwaukee voucher program, see Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 6xx, cert.
denied 525 U.S. 997 (1998). The Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio’s Blaine Amendment
would not be an impediment to the Cleveland voucher plan, Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d
at 212. Neither the Wisconsin nor the Ohio provision, however, included a sweeping, Floridatype bar on direct or indirect aid to a religious institution.
167

A mirroring interpretation of a state provision on church-state relations would tie the
state law to the law of the federal establishment clause, whatever that law happened to be at any
given moment. A number of state courts have embraced mirroring interpretations of other sorts
of provisions, including those related to religion. See Angela Carmella, State Constitutional
Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. Rev.
275 (documenting the trend in state supreme courts to cut their religious liberty law loose from
parallel federal law in the wake of Emp. Div. v. Smith). A different sort of impediment to
voucher arrangements has arisen in the past. Prior to Zelman, some courts refused to permit
voucher-type payments to religious schools because of perceived federal constitutional
restrictions. See Strout v. Albanese, 178 F. 3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 320
(1999); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dist., 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 364
(1999). Both Bagley and Strout hold that the Establishment Clause forbids Maine from
including religious schools in a voucher plan for secondary schooling of students in rural
districts. Bagley and Strout now of course must be overruled, unless state law independently
supports their result.
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the logic of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Zelman, which emphasizes the fact of parental
designation rather than state transfer of scholarship funds to religious schools, may influence the
interpretation of some state courts in which the scope of the Blaine Amendment is an open
question. To the extent Zelman rests on a notion that parents rather than the state are responsible
for the transfer of resources to religious schools, state courts may borrow from this reasoning to
conclude that similar schemes do not involve the state in transfers of the sort forbidden by their
own constitutions.
There definitely will remain, however, a number of states – including, as of this writing,
the state of Florida – in which courts resist such interpretations of their Blaine Amendments, and
still other states whose Blaine Amendments have been recently construed in ways that make
them more hostile to educational voucher plans than is required by current federal constitutional
law. The best-known and prominent example of a state with a still-robust Separationist approach
to these questions is that of Washington State. After the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986 ruled
unanimously that the federal Establishment Clause did not preclude the use, at a beneficiaryselected bible college, of state vocational training funds for the blind,168 the Washington Supreme
Court held on remand of the case that the state constitution’s Blaine Amendment nevertheless
precludes such use.169
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Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
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Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (1989). Article I, section 11 of
the Washington State Constitution provides that “No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any
religious establishment.” Washington may have backtracked from that position in recent years.
See Malyon v. Pierce County, 935 P.2d 1272 (Wash. 1997). Nevertheless, Washington appears
to be a true “separationist” state, holding religious institutions to be constitutionally distinctive
for purposes of both benefits, see Witters, and burdens, see First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 840
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In July of 2002, however, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit
cast doubt on the continued validity of Washington’s Blaine Amendment, at least as applied to a
program of indirect funding. In Davey v. Locke,170 the panel ruled (2-1) that the state constitution
could not justify the exclusion, from the state-sponsored “Promise Scholarship” program, of
students majoring in theology at private, religiously affiliated schools. The Program included
students majoring in other subjects at those schools, and the panel opinion suggests that it
included as well those students studying theology as part of a course of study at state-run
schools.171 Such an exclusion, the panel majority ruled, burdened the student’s rights under the
Free Exercise Clause of the federal constitution, and the state constitution applied to these facts
did not promote a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the exclusion. Davey involves a form
of voucher program, and its holding casts doubt on whether Blaine Amendments can lawfully
limit state voucher programs to secular options without running afoul of the federal
constitution.172

P. 2d 174 (Wash. 1992). For further discussion of First Covenant and its place in Separationist
thinking, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
Constitutional Order, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 37 (2002).
170

2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 14461 (No. 00-35962, July 18, 2002).
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Id. at xxx. The opinion is oblique on this point, and some ambiguity remains
concerning the state’s treatment of courses on theology taught at state universities. Slip op. At
10143-44.
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Our own view of Davey v. Locke is that it is correctly decided on equal protection
and/or free speech grounds, and that its suggested sweeping condemnation of Washington’s
Blaine Amendment is too broad. Davey relied on Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), to hold that all discrimination against religion is constitutionally
suspect. That decision, however, involved a coercive prohibition against a religious practice, and
a gerrymander of the ordinance designed to impede the rituals of one and only one sect. As we
see the problem in Davey, the vice of Washington’s policy is that it singled out a particular
58

Several scholars have analyzed the federal constitutional problem presented by
Washington State and other states whose constitutions, as construed, would impede the inclusion
of religious schools in any voucher program that would result in a transfer of state funds to
private schools.

What has begun to pass for conventional wisdom among these scholars goes

something like this. Blaine Amendments, so construed, no longer have federal law for
reinforcement. By excluding religious entities from aid that may go to secular organizations,
state law of this character: 1) presumptively violates the equal protection clause by using
religion, an arguably suspect classifying criterion, as a basis for excluding some entities from aid;
2) offends free exercise norms by singling out religious associations for disfavored treatment;
and 3) independent of the first two arguments, violates the Constitution because enactment of the
state provision was the product of anti-Catholic animus.173
The first two of these theories may seem to amount to one and the same thing, but they
turn out to be fetchingly different. The equal protection argument is even-handed as between
religious and secular entities; if, after all, “religion” is a generically suspect classifying trait, it
should be equally suspicious if the state favors or disfavors religious institutions. Under this
theory of equal protection, state law that disables religious institutions only from receiving
benefits is presumptively unconstitutional, but state policies that provide special

viewpoint concerning religious studies and refused to fund it, while financing other viewpoints
about religious studies. Whatever legitimate interest the state has in an institutional churchstate separation broader than that required by federal law, that interest cannot justify the
viewpoint-based discrimination in which Washington State appears to have engaged. See
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
173

Treene, Grand Finale, supra, at 12-13; Heytens, Virginia Note, note xx supra, at 140-

153.
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accommodations for religious causes and institutions, and treat them more favorably than their
secular counterparts, are likewise presumptively invalid.174
Such a doctrine is in sharp tension with the Supreme Court’s invitation in Employment
Division v. Smith175 to legislatures to make precisely such generic accommodations of religion.176
Moreover, the anti-Blaine forces tend to be protective of state-created accommodations for
religious institutions and causes. Accordingly, their preferred approach to the problem of
discrimination against religious entities rests on the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.177 Its premise is that the state may not generically treat religious entities worse
than secular ones. To do so is, in free exercise terms, to “burden” religious institutions by
disqualifying them from opportunities open to analogous secular organizations.178 Those who
adopt this argument, as did the 9th Circuit panel in Davey v. Locke, presume that all generic
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This theory would force a change in the result in decisions like East Bay Local Dev.
Corp. v.California, 13 P.3d 1122 (Cal. 2000) (upholding power of self-designated exemption, for
all noncommercial property owned by religious corporations, from state or local schemes of
historic preservation. We discuss East Bay further in Distinctive Place, note xx supra.
175

494 U.S. 913 (1990).

176

For debate on the constitutionality of such accommodations, compare Ira C. Lupu,
Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of
Religion, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 555 (1991) with Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 685 (1992).
177

The Free Exercise Clause has applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment
since the Supreme Court’s decision in Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
178

For fuller explication of the notion of free exercise “burdens,” see Ira C. Lupu, Where
Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 933
(1989). Although that article argues that discrimination against religion should count a s such a
burden, cases later decided under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act occasionally held to the
contrary. See Fordham University v. Brown, 856 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1994).
60

disfavoring of religious entities is unconstitutional unless such policies can satisfy strict judicial
scrutiny – i.e., unless the state can demonstrate that the policy is narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest.179
The Free Exercise approach spares religious accommodations from its wrath, but it has a
deep flaw of its own. American constitutional law, federal and state, has for many years done
exactly what this argument condemns. The law of the federal Establishment Clause has been
and continues to be that the state may not make unrestricted, direct transfers of funds to religious
organizations, because the principal activity of such organizations – religious worship – is
something which the state may neither regulate nor subsidize.180 Nor is this the only
constitutionally required exclusion of religious organizations from a state protection or benefit.
The state operates under religion-specific constitutional limitations with respect to disputes,
relating to property or personnel, that are internal to religious communities and organizations.181
The state’s obligation either to refrain from intervening in such disputes,182 or to adjudicate them
under principles which can be applied without reference to religious matters,183 is both a
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This standard of review is drawn from Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), which involved the imposition of coercive, animal protection
legislation upon a particular religious sect, rather than the limitation of a government benefit to
secular organizations.
180

Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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For discussion of relevant principles, see, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979);
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440
(1969); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976);Gonzalez v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Watson v. Jones,80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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Watson v. Jones,80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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privilege of religious communities, because it reduces government interference in religious
affairs, and an imposition upon those communities, because it deprives religious factions of the
opportunity for authoritative dispute resolution by the state.184
The argument that Blaine Amendments are presumptively unconstitutional because they
single out religious entities for special treatment thus proves far too much; if the line between
religious and nonreligious organizations is a constitutionally suspect one, each and every
religion-specific doctrine under the federal Religion Clauses becomes constitutionally doubtful
as well.185 An interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause that casts doubt on many longstanding
constitutional norms seems questionable indeed.186
A narrower argument against the Blaine Amendments that voucher proponents may
make would focus on the change in federal Establishment Clause law represented by recent

184

Frederick M. Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of The Establishment Clause (ms. On file
with the authors). Another example of religion-specific treatment required by the Constitution
are the rulings of a number of lower court decisions to the effect that government may not apply
anti-discrimination law to the relationship between religious entities and clergy. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (DC Cir. 1996). We discuss the
ministerial exception at length in Distinctive Place, note xx, supra. But these rulings rest on the
free exercise clause as well as the establishment clause, and represent an immunity from
regulation rather than an exclusion from state largesse.
185

A doctrine that made suspect all distinctions between religion and nonreligion would
also throw into doubt the various religious freedom restoration acts enacted by the federal
government (cite RFRA and RLUIPA) and many states (cite examples) since the Supreme
Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith.
186

In reaching its conclusion that all discriminations against religious entities are
constitutionally suspect, the 9th Circuit panel in Davey v. Locke relied heavily on McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). McDaniel invalidated a state law prohibition on clergy serving as
elected representatives in state legislatures. Because the restriction in McDaniel operated to
coercively exclude clergy from one aspect of the right of self-government, the decision does not
necessarily extend to state law exclusions of religious entities from state largesse. But the 9th
Circuit did not explore any such distinction.
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cases, including Agostini v. Felton,187 Mitchell v. Helms,188 and Zelman itself. The premise of
this theory is that states may indeed treat religious institutions differently from secular ones, but
only to the extent that federal constitutional law so requires. If this were the law, states would be
obliged to ensure that they did not directly aid the specifically religious activities of private
organizations, but states with voucher programs could not rely on their Blaine Amendments to
exclude religious schools because Zelman teaches that federal law does not so require.
This approach does not unravel existing federal constitutional law, but it has strange
consequences in the federal system. States would be free under this theory to construe their
Blaine Amendments in only one way – to mirror whatever the U.S. Supreme Court held at any
given time was required by the Establishment Clause. This leaves the states absolutely no room
to have a nonestablishment policy broader than whatever five Supreme Court Justices find to be
the content of federal law at any given moment. The upshot would be to deny the states any
room whatsoever for their own church-state policy, even if that policy had been federal
constitutional law a few short years ago. It’s hard to imagine a doctrine more hostile to notions
of respect for state law, and in particular to the tradition of independent state constitutional
law.189 Although he of course was imagining that states would be pro-religion rather than the
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521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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530 U.S. 793 (2000).

189

The late Justice Brennan was an ardent champion of the independent development of
state constitutional law. See William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protections of
Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). ADD articles by state supreme court judges
who have made similar pleas. Indeed, friends of religious liberty, upset at the Supreme Court’s
decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), have urged state courts to
develop independent free exercise policy under state law, and some states have done precisely
that in the last dozen years See, e.g., First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 840 P. 2d 174 (Wash.
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opposite, Justice Thomas urged in Zelman that states be given room to fashion their own churchstate policies, and the campaign against the Blaine Amendments threatens state autonomy of
precisely that character.
Sensitive to these considerations of federalism, we believe that states should be free to
make their own constitutional policy of church-state relations, and to extend it beyond the federal
policy, so long as the state approach serves reasonable purposes of the sort associated with the
regime of Separationism. What is obvious, however, is that those purposes need some
restatement and reinvigoration. As Separationism has come under attack in recent years, its
defenders – the Zelman dissenters prominently among them – have tended to rely excessively on
justifications now viewed by many as outmoded. A result that four of nine Justices vehemently
favored in Zelman may be constitutionally reasonable, but not just because they so conclude.
Whether states can defend a Separationist policy broader than the federal constitution requires
will thus depend on the efforts of judges and academics to provide precisely this sort of
rehabilitation of the Separationist ethos.190
Separationism aside, there is one very stark way for a state to reconcile a strenuous
Separationist policy with norms of equality, from wherever drawn. Equality can be achieved by

1992). For discussion of this trend, see Angela Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of
Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 275
(documenting the trend in state supreme courts to cut their religious liberty law loose from
parallel federal law in the wake of Emp. Div. v. Smith).
190

We have tried to do some of this work ourselves. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and Sectarian Service
Providers, 18 J. L. & Politics xx (forthcoming, 2002); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The
Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 37 (2002).
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equalizing down as well as up.191 States can simultaneously comply with their Blaine
Amendments and norms of equality simply by treating religious and nonreligious private
organizations alike, and excluding all from the aid that the state constitution precludes going to
the religious entities. Such an approach would entail, for example, a school choice program
limited to public schools only. 192
This strategy, however, cannot help the broader voucher movement, and its emphasis on
maximizing parental choice in ways that include private schools, religious and otherwise. If
courts permit the states to maintain church-state policies more Separationist than the federal
constitution requires, with or without the equality kicker, is the attempt to advance the school
voucher movement by ousting the Blaine Amendments doomed to failure? Perhaps it is not. We
think there is one argument that may yet push the attack on the Blaines over the top, but it is the
most ornery and least generic of the arguments frequently advanced against such amendments.
The anti-Catholic origins of at least some of the Blaines may be a powerful source of
constitutional condemnation.

The argument is made yet stronger – and the Supreme Court’s

receptivity to it made more obvious – by the view expressed in the plurality opinion in Mitchell
v. Helms193 that the judge-made doctrine which excluded “pervasively sectarian” entities from
government assistance was a product of anti-Catholic bigotry. The underlying premise of the
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See, e.g., California Savings & Loan v. Guerra,, xxx U.S. xxx (19xx) (federal law
outlawing sex discrimination does not pre-empt state requirement for maternity leave, because
employer can comply with both by providing paternity as well as and maternity benefits).
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This is the approach advocated in Richard Kahlenberg, All Together Now: Creating
Middle Class Schools Through Public School Choice (2001).
193

530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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Mitchell plurality is that the line of decisions from Lemon to Aguilar, representing the high water
mark of Separationism, is itself blemished by such prejudice. If it can be proven that a particular
state added a Blaine-type Amendment, blocking all forms of material transfer to religious
institutions, because of anti-Catholic sentiment, federal constitutional law would strongly support
the invalidation of such an amendment.
Several discrete lines of case law, under a variety of constitutional provisions, intertwine
around this view. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah,194 the Supreme Court
unanimously held that a city’s policy, ostensibly designed to protect a religion-neutral concern
for animal welfare, had been gerrymandered for the purpose of impeding animal sacrifice as
practiced by a particular sect, and therefore violated the Free Exercise Clause unless it could
meet the requirements of strict constitutional scrutiny. In Larson v. Valente,195 the Court applied
a similar doctrine under the Establishment Clause to a Minnesota statute, regulating fund-raising
practices, that the Court found had been covertly designed to burden the Unification Church and
to leave untouched the practices of mainstream faiths. If courts take this approach in challenges
to the Blaines, the state is not likely to prevail; as Davey v. Locke reveals, it will be very difficult
to show that a strict separationist posture, now partly repudiated in federal law, is narrowly
tailored to compelling state interests.
Away from the field of religion, the Equal Protection Clause (and the equal protection
component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment) have been pressed into similar
service, but with significant doctrinal differences from the Religion Clause cases just described.
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508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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456 U.S. 228 (1982).
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In Washington v. Davis,196 the Court held that covert unconstitutional purposes – in that case,
alleged racial animosity – could render a race-neutral scheme unconstitutional. In the Arlington
Heights decision,197 the Court clarified that evidence of such purposes tainted a government
decision, but did not trigger conventional strict scrutiny; instead, it shifted the burden to the
government to demonstrate that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the
impermissible motive. Perhaps the age of the Blaine Amendments would make it unlikely that
states could carry such a burden, but this approach leaves open a plausible way for the state to
preserve a Blaine Amendment even if its past is tainted by sectarian hostility.
The legal setting of the Blaine Amendments in state constitutions, rather than statutory
law, in no way immunizes them in any way from claims of unconstitutional motivation. In
Hunter v. Underwood,198 the Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the Alabama
Constitution, disfranchising a very wide group of persons who had been convicted of a felony;
the Court found indisputable evidence that the backers of the provision had been motivated by a
desire to disfranchise African-Americans. And, most recently, the Court rendered its most
controversial invalidation of a state constitutional amendment; in Romer v. Evans,199 it ruled that
Colorado’s attempt to constitutionalize a prohibition on protecting gays and lesbians from
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426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See also Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ. V. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (proof that the dismissal of
government employee is tainted by constitutionally impermissible reason shifts burden to the
state to show that the dismissal would have occurred independent of that reason).
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471 U.S. 222 (1985).

199

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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discrimination had been motivated by a constitutionally forbidden anti-homosexual animus.
If we are correct that the most persuasive constitutional argument against Blaine
Amendments is that each may have been motivated by anti-Catholic animus, the path for those
who are fighting for vouchers, and against the Blaines, is twisted and uphill. First, the fight must
be won on state-specific historical grounds in each and every jurisdiction. Even if the case for
anti-Catholic animus as a motivating force is supported by substantial historical evidence in some
states,200 the case may not be nearly so easy to make in others. The problem of proof may be
especially acute with respect to states in the West, where Congress may have required states
newly entering the Union to include a Blaine-type provision in their constitutions as a condition of
entry.201 With respect to such states, challengers may have to show that the Congress(es) that
imposed such conditions were moved by impermissible hostility to the Roman Catholic Church.
Evidence of this may not be easy to find, and courts in any event, influenced by the decision in
United States v. O’Brien,202 may not be receptive.
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Becket Fund lawsuit – details of attempted immunization of Mass provision – see
Treene, Grand Finale.
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Id. at 8-9. Even with respect to those states in which the anti-Catholic case can be
made, it will depend entirely on constitutional history, and statements from legislative debates.
Of course, some Justices (most notably Justice Scalia, whose vote may well be necessary to form
a majority in favor of invalidating a Blaine Amendment in the Supreme Court) are on record as
being opposed to judicial reliance on such evidence of covert motivation. See, e.g., Church of
Lukumi Bablu Aye, Inc. V. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, xxx (Scalia, J., concurring); Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, xxx (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). By the same token, will those
who normally are willing to consider such evidence, but who dissented in Zelman, be willing to
invalidate Blaine Amendments, sect-neutral and separationist on their face, when confronted with
such evidence? The ironies presented by the attack on the Blaine Amendments are rich and
thick, and uncertainty about the outcome in the Supreme Court of an animus-based challenge to a
Blaine Amendment affects the overall picture for the litigants.
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Moreover, an animus-based theory of why a Blaine Amendment is unconstitutional invites
the possibility of successful contemporary reenactment. If Blaine Amendments are generically
unconstitutional because they disfavor religious entities, current enactment or reenactment of such
a restriction is constitutionally doomed. If, however, a state enacts one today in a climate that
precludes an inference that it has been motivated by sectarian animus, it would stand on the same
footing as a 19th century enactment in a state in which animus could not be proven. This
proposition is well illustrated by the contrast between the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hunter v.
Underwood203 and Richardson v. Ramirez.204 In the former, the Court held unconstitutional a state
constitutional provision disfranchising all persons convicted of crimes involving “moral
turpitude,” on the basis of evidence that it had been motivated by a desire to exclude AfricanAmericans from the vote; in the latter, the Court upheld a California provision disfranchising all
convicted felons, a restriction on voting that had not been shown to be impermissibly
motivated.205
If the campaign against the Blaines fails in the courts, the anti-Blaine, pro-voucher forces
might consider one other strategy. Perhaps Congress would have power, acting under section 5 of
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418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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Id. at xx. One can imagine, therefore, that invalidation of a Blaine Amendment may
lead to a political campaign to reenact some new version of a comparable restriction on churchstate relations. Even if contemporary reenactment will effectively reinstate a Blaine Amendment,
however, invalidation of the 19th century version will place the burden of political inertia on the
anti-voucher forces rather than, as is currently the case, on the pro-voucher forces who are
leading the charge against the Blaines. The invalidation of the anti-gay amendment in Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) could not similarly be overcome by re-enactment, because the Court
held that provision invalid on its face rather than corrupted by covert, impermissible motivation.
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the 14th Amendment, to legislate against the Blaine Amendments. The theory would resemble that
which in part underlay the Supreme Court’s willingness to uphold voting rights legislation in
Katzenbach v. Morgan206 – that a state law, seemingly neutral, had in part been motivated by
impermissible prejudice. As we have suggested above, the same sort of case could be mounted
against the Blaines. If the anti-Catholic animus underlying the enactment of many of the Blaines
is sufficiently widespread, Congress arguably should have power to legislatively preempt them all,
on the theory that litigants should not be put to the difficult burden of state-by-state proof of such
prejudice.
An effort to legislate under section 5, however, even if politically feasible, would no doubt
face substantial constitutional obstacles. First, City of Boerne v. Flores,207 and the Supreme
Court’s still more recent decisions on state sovereign immunity,208 suggest growing limits on
congressional power to use section five to interfere with the legal autonomy of the states. The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, invalidated as applied to the states in City of Boerne,
challenged a particular Supreme Court decision in a way that an anti-Blaine enactment would not,
but the overriding concerns for federalism, and judicial control over the meaning of the
Constitution, would remain. Perhaps the fact that Congress and the Court would be moving in
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See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, xxx U.S.
xxx, 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002).
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the same direction on nonestablishment norms – as was precisely not the case with respect to the
religious Freedom Restoration Act - would help buttress the constitutionality of such a federal
law. The Establishment Clause, however, originally protected state religious establishments
against federal interference,209 and one wonders if it would protect state nonestablishments with
equal force.210 To put the point differently, an anti-Blaine enactment by Congress might well be
seen as a law “respecting an establishment of religion.”
This discussion of reliance on political processes to rehabilitate or eradicate the Blaine
Amendments suggests, as do many other features of this story, that the resources necessary on
both sides of this struggle may be very large indeed. State constitutional law, and its validity
under federal constitutional norms, is likely to play a major role in the post-Zelman struggle over
vouchers, but it is impossible at this point to identify all the ways in which the state-federal
interplay may evolve. At the least, one would expect pro-voucher strategists (as distinguished
from pure anti-Blaine strategists) to look for states without Blaine Amendments to push most
aggressively for new voucher programs. Despite the lift provided by Zelman, the question of
whether the politics of vouchers, and the constitutional law controlling vouchers, will interact
productively for the pro-voucher forces is now only a matter of long-term speculation.
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This of course is one of the central points of Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in
Zelman. See TAN xx supra.
210

For development of the argument that Congress is barred by the First Amendment
from legislating on the subject of religion and state law, see Jay Bybee, Taking Liberties with the
First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 Vand. L.
Rev. 1539 (1995).
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B. Conditions on Providers in Voucher-Financed Programs
The second major focus of post-Zelman legal controversy will emerge from the debate
about the obligations of participating schools and social service providers. In particular, a
coalition of opponents of vouchers, those generally skeptical about using public money to educate
children in private schools, and those who simply believe that private organizations receiving
public money must take on a certain public-regarding character211 are likely to press for a variety
of conditions which providers must meet. Although there are refinements and qualifications that
we discuss below, our basic position on such conditions is simply stated – most such conditions
are entirely a matter of political discretion. The Constitution does not require them, and it rarely
forbids them. Many in the voucher wars disagree with our basic position,212 however, and there
are subtle differences among such conditions. Thus, we believe that it is worth breaking them
down into categories and analyzing them separately.
Perhaps the easiest set of conditions to analyze are those limited to voucher students only.
These might include requirements of nondiscrimination on many different grounds, including
disability, academic performance, race, religion, and others. The Cleveland plan, for example, did
not permit participating schools to select among those students who had been awarded an Ohio
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See, e.g., Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals: Privatization and the Common Good
92-93 (Beacon Press 2002) (arguing that “school voucher plans must preserve public values in
the schools found eligible for the vouchers”).
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See, e.g., Michael Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1917
(2001) (asserting broad theory of freedom of association and expression for religious institutions,
whetheror not they are accepting state benefits; others (Americans United, People for American
Way, Lambda Legal Defense, etc.) who take polar opposite view, government may not subsidize
discrimination
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Scholarship,213 and it explicitly prohibited discrimination based on race, religion, and ethnicity.214
Another possible condition, narrowly tailored to voucher students only, may attach to
religious education and experience expected of those students. Milwaukee, for example, required
participating schools to offer voucher students an opt-out from religious training.215 Cleveland did
not so require, and Florida has taken a compromise position, permitting students to remain passive
when confronted with obligations of religious affirmation.216
Any condition limited to voucher students may conceivably alter the character of a school,
but participating schools have obvious mechanisms of control over such transformation, because
of their power to set the number of voucher students each will take. Having ten per cent voucher
students, who may not share the faith tradition at the school, will have very different
consequences for the school’s religious ambience over time than having fifty percent of the
students be both voucher-supported and unconnected to the faith. In any event, we believe that
conditions limited to voucher students only will be by far the easiest to justify under the
constitution. These are the students for whom the state is paying, and any condition that is
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The statutes required selection among eligible students to be random, subject to
categorical priorities (low-income before others) and an exception for siblings of pre-exisitng
students in the private schools. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sec. 3313.977 (A)(1).
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Id. at sec. 3313.976(A)(6). The full scope of this provision is quite unclear, but all
parties in Zelman agreed that it covers admission of voucher students
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See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 609 Wis. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 997

(1998).
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The Florida plan’s opt-out provision is narrower than Milwaukee’s, because it forbids
compulsory worship but permits compulsory religious education. See Florida Stat., chap. 229,
Title XVI, sec. 229.0537(4)(j) (voucher students may not be compelled “to profess any sectarian
belief, to pray, or to worship.”). We discuss the constitutional significance of such opt-outs in
Sites of Redemption, note xx supra.
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reasonably related to the state’s programmatic purpose in so paying should be easily withstand
constitutional scrutiny. 217
The set of conditions much more likely to invite large-scale controversy, both political and
constitutional, are those which effectively regulate the provider in its entirety rather in its
relationship to voucher beneficiaries. Conditions of this sort, which use voucher money to
leverage control over the school as a whole, fall into several categories. First, voucher programs
may insist that participating private schools test all of their students, report their test scores, or
otherwise respond to concerns for academic performance and accountability in precisely the same
way that public schools must. Such conditions present distinct and obvious benefits and costs.
Taxpayers reasonably want to know whether they are supporting programs of quality, and parents
trying to decide among schools can certainly make use of such information. These goals can be
only incompletely fulfilled by a condition requiring testing and reporting for voucher students
only; the number of those may be very small, and testing and reporting about all students provides
much more comprehensive information, especially for parents making choices at an early stage in
the life of the voucher program. On the other hand, testing regimes may be expensive, and may
tend to alter the curriculum as schools face pressure to teach to the evaluative tests.218 In the
experimental stage of voucher programs, schools may be reluctant to participate if they must
substantially change their educational protocols in order to educate even a small number of
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effect of testing regimes on curriculum
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voucher students.
Whatever their policy merits, the only constitutional questions suggested by conditions of
this sort involve issues of religious neutrality. We believe that the state has substantial discretion
to impose an accountability regime on private schools generally that is either the same as or
different from those in the public schools, which the state controls more totally. Zelman’s
emphasis on neutrality suggests that the only constitutional constraint on conditions of
accountability is the obligation to treat secular and religious private schools alike.219
The more constitutionally controversial conditions likely to be imposed on voucher
providers regulate their freedom of association, or freedom of expression. The Ohio voucher
program, for example, included a provision forbidding participating schools from discriminating
“on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background,”220 and another forbidding such schools from
teaching “hatred of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or
religion.”221 The scope of the anti-discrimination provision in Ohio is uncertain; no party in
Zelman challenged it, and it may or may not apply to admission of nonvoucher students, or to
hiring of teachers or other school staff. The anti-hate provision, by contrast, seems crystal clear in
its exclusion of certain messages from those advanced by the school, but here too no challenge has
yet been made to the provision by a school or anyone else.
If either of these conditions were imposed coercively on schools independent of statecreated benefits, we think the case for their unconstitutionality might be quite strenuous indeed,
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Id. at sec. 3313.976(A)(6).
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and in any event would be considerably stronger than the case for their unconstitutionality as
conditions on benefits. The anti-hate provision singles out points of view and outlaws their
transmission to the young. Our tradition of free speech suggests ample protections for these
points of view, however obnoxious, against government attempts to generally suppress them.222
Teaching that the Christian view of God and the world is correct, for example, implies that some
other views are mistaken, and the state may not preclude such teaching, nor specify the intensity
or language with which it is accomplished.223
If completely detached from state benefits, an anti-discrimination condition is likely to be
constitutional in most of its applications, but somewhat doubtful in others that impinge on
freedom of religious association and expression. Religious schools’ most powerful claim to be
free from anti-discrimination law arises from their interest in limiting the religious identity of
students or employees, especially employees whose efforts shape the religious mission of the
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395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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school.224 The Supreme Court’s decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale225 protects the
associational freedom of private, cause-oriented organizations to select their spokespersons, and it
is no great leap from Dale to the associational freedom of a school to select its students on the
basis of communal, faith-based identity. Similar considerations would support limiting
employees to members of the faith around which the school is organized, or to exclude, as in
Dale, students or faculty whose views or behavior is deemed inconsistent with that faith. A
Sunday School housed in a place of worship, for example, should be free to limit its students to
those whose families share its religious commitments, and to exclude from its teaching staff those
not of its faith and those it deems to be sinners.226
Once the state offers benefits in exchange for limitations on expression or association,
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A comparable claim by religious schools to engage in racial and ethnic exclusion of
students or employees would likely fare much worse. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.160 (1976) (racial discrimination by private
academies violates 1866 Civil Rights Act).
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The line of lower court decisions protecting the right of religious organizations to be
free of anti-discrimination law in choosing clergy supports the autonomy of religious schools in
selecting spokespersons for their religious tradition. See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460
F.2d 553, 560-61 (1972); EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (DC Cir. 1996).
Many religious institutions offer programs of weekend or after-school instruction in their culture,
customs, and worship. Would the constitution permit the state to outlaw religious
discrimination in hiring teachers for such a program, or to regulate what is taught – positive or
negative – about various faith traditions? We doubt it; see, e,g,. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273
U.S. 284 (1927) (holding that territory of Hawaii may not forbid parents of Japanese descent
from providing after-school instruction in programs teaching Japanese language and culture).
The federal civil rights laws, and many state laws as well, permit religious entities to
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Establishment Clause attack, see Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), but
there is no reason to suppose that it is required by the Constitution with respect to all positions in
religious organizations.
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however, appraisal of the constitutionality of these limits inevitably must change. Unlike the
situation with respect to free-standing prohibitions, religious institutions may escape the force of
such conditions by rejecting the accompanying benefits. Under current arrangements, however,
virtually every school engaged in day-long instruction of the young receives such benefits, and
they cannot be easily rejected. Often overlooked in the constitutional case against conditions on
voucher schools is that all of them must be accredited by the state. Accreditation, which permits
parents to satisfy the compulsory attendance laws by sending their children to an approved school,
is itself a substantial state-conferred benefit, justifying a variety of autonomy-limiting regulations
on curriculum, teacher credentials, and other attributes of educational institutions.227 The financial
support that vouchers bring merely adds political impetus, not constitutional warrant, for the
imposition of regulatory conditions.
The state has considerable – though not infinite – leeway to impose limits on statebenefitted schools that the First Amendment would not tolerate if applied coercively to all
expressive organizations. We cannot in this space tackle the entire, unwieldy subject of
unconstitutional conditions,228 but we can at least make a reasonable appraisal of the ways in
which these issues might be framed. First, the Supreme Court’s oft-reaffirmed decision in Pierce
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v. Society of Sisters229 creates an obligation for states to permit private schools, religious and
otherwise, as alternatives to the public schools as a means of satisfying compulsory education
requirements. Accordingly, a sweeping condition on accreditation that all schools be secular
would without question violate the federal Constitution.230
Second, at a minimum, conditions on schools that wish to participate in a voucher program
must be reasonable in light of the program’s purposes and other legitimate governmental
concerns.231 On this score, it will be impossible to persuade judges that anti-discrimination
conditions that apply to the admission of students, or to the hiring of all but the most religiously
sensitive positions, are unreasonable. Ensuring equal opportunity for students to attend publicly
supported schools, or for employees to work in such schools, comports with public policy that has
been widely adopted in the United States for the last 30 years or more.232 It may be that religious
schools can insist that classes in theology, or other aspects of religious culture, be taught only by
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United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (rejecting claim of free exercise immunity Internal Revenue
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discrimination by private academies violates 1866 Civil Rights Act).
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persons from within a particular faith tradition; the state’s interest in regulating hiring for such
positions, even if it supports the school through vouchers, seems especially weak. Beyond this
narrow group of courses, however, schools will have a difficult time arguing that they should be
free to accept voucher payments while simultaneously repudiating limits on their hiring
discretion; schools that want history, or chemistry, or any other secular subject taught from a
particular religious perspective will simply have to insist that members of their instructional staff,
whatever their faith, communicate that religious dimension.233
Voucher conditions that limit the content of expression by schools and their agents
arguably present tougher First Amendment questions. For example, the Cleveland voucher
program included a restriction on “teach[ing] hatred of any person or group on the basis of race,
ethnicity, national origin or religion.”234 Analyzing this sort of restriction requires attention to a
line of decisions, most recently capped by Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez,235 in which
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531 U.S. 533 (2001). Velazquez produced a surprising 5-4 invalidation of an
expressive restriction on a government-funded private entity. Four of the five Justices in the
Zelman majority are also in the Velazquez dissent. So those on the Court most receptive to use of
vouchers at religious schools are least receptive to controlling the government’s ability to
condition its transfers on speech restrictions, and four of the Justices most willing to invalidate
such speech restrictions are constitutionally opposed to use of vouchers at religious schools.
Justice Kennedy, who authored Velazquez, is the only Justice to join in both of these opinions of
the Court. Here, as was the case in the discussion of the Blaine Amendments, the ironies are
rich, and the tensions among positions by various Justices are thick.
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the Supreme Court has drawn a series of lines between acceptable and unacceptable restrictions
on speech by government-financed private entities. These decisions are not a model of clarity and
consistency, to say the least, but certain key principles stand out, and all of them can be fruitfully
applied to schools participating in voucher programs.
First, the cases suggest a crucial distinction between situations involving government
promotion of particular messages – e.g., in favor of decency in art,236 or carrying pregnancies to
full term237 – through the financing of private speakers, and the government contracting for some
service independent of the delivery of any particular message.238 Government power to restrict
speech is less in the latter situation, because the state cannot make the claim that it is simply
controlling its agents’ transmission of a message that the agent has been engaged to deliver.
Are voucher schools the agents of government and its chosen messages? They cannot be
in the absolute sense, because the government may not employ religious speech as part of its own.
But accredited schools are always in some sense acting as agents of the state, and the state has
sufficient reason to control the content of some of their messages. The regulation of curriculum,
common to accreditation efforts, is a viewpoint-neutral regulation of content – it specifies the
subjects which the school must address. Moreover, the regulation of messages of intolerance or
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hatred for religious or racial groups is bound up with education for citizenship in a liberal,
inclusive democracy. Thus, for the state to insist on this particular exclusion from the school’s
message seems to us a reasonable regulation of curricular content. By contrast, the school’s
affirmative statement of its own religious commitments – for example, the Divinity of Jesus, or
the Prophetic status of Moses or Mohammed – is beyond the scope of state control.

The state

has no legitimate interest in barring such a message, and to permit it to do so would be to
effectively exclude certain faiths from operating schools, contrary to the requirements of Pierce.239
Second, the cases involving restrictions on government-financed speakers emphasize the
breadth of the restriction’s impact on a speaker’s overall expressive activity, including the portion
which may be privately financed.240 If the government exacts from the speaker a promise to
refrain from the message under all circumstances, privately or publicly supported, or otherwise
makes it practically impossible for the speaker to communicate the message on her own, it is
using its resources impermissibly to gain leverage over wholly private speech.
This consideration, as applied to schools participating in voucher programs, is not likely to
strengthen the argument against such conditions. In defense of a restriction on hate speech in
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voucher schools, the government could responsibly argue that participating religious communities
are free to operate more than one school, and preach whatever hatred they want in those schools
that do not accept voucher students. More realistically and powerfully, the government can argue
that faith communities are quite entirely free to preach hatred of others in their worship activities,
or other communicative efforts, outside of school. These activities are constitutionally outside of
regulatory control as well as government financial support. So religious communities may teach
hatred of others, but they may be restricted from teaching such attitudes in state-supported
schools, whether the support takes the form of vouchers or is limited to accreditation.
Third, government is under a more strenuous obligation to permit competing viewpoints
when its resources are provided in a way that can be characterized as the creation of a public
forum. Rosenberger v. University of Virginia241 and Widmar v. Vincent242 present such cases in
the context of religious association and expression. Ordinarily, however, the provision of public
services – even if they have an expressive component – is conceptually distinct from the creation
of a forum for debate. Unlike the context of public fora, in which the state provides resources for
the very purpose of association and expression, school choice programs have the narrower and
more focused purpose of delivering educational service to the young in the community. For
example, the state can and should exclude incompetent or highly inefficient providers from such a
service program; policies of this sort are entirely alien to the concept of a public forum, in which
speakers are presumed equal in their right to participate.
We consider one final question concerning conditions on voucher schools. If religious
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schools are not constitutionally exempt from such regulation, may the state legislatively exempt
religious schools only from such conditions? The Supreme Court has held that such exemptions
are sometimes permissible and sometimes not. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos243
upheld a statutory exemption for religious entities from the prohibition on religious discrimination
in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.244 Accommodations of this sort, which protect
associational freedom of religious organizations to prefer their own members, can be justified on a
theory of equality – they permit religious communities, like other organizations, to prefer those
who are ideologically in tune with existing members.
Other discretionary accommodations, however, which have the quality of religious
preferences rather than equalizers, have fared badly in the Supreme Court,245 and the constitutional
presumption is against them. Accommodations of religious institutions alone are justifiable only
when failure to accommodate them poses some unique threat to their religious mission, and the
threat to secular entities is not similar. In general, we think that the case for preferring religious
schools to secular private schools with respect to conditions concerning curriculum,
accountability, and teacher credentials (as distinguished from religious identity), to name a few, is
quite weak.
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84

As we have argued elsewhere,246 the Constitution should require neutrality between
religious and secular entities unless a case can be made that distinctive attributes of religious
communities justify different treatment. For most conditions that states will impose on schools
participating in voucher programs, no such case for religious distinctiveness can be made.
Nothing in Zelman operates to change the law in ways that would or should have impact on the
scope of state power to create religion-specific accommodations.
C. Zelman and the Charitable Choice Movement
The context of Zelman is education, but in principle its approval of indirect funding of
services provided by religious entities extends seamlessly to other social services.247 Formal
neutrality and “true private choice” remain the measure of constitutionality. Moreover, state
constitutions are likely to present many of the same impediments to inclusion of faith-based
providers of social services as they do to the inclusion of religious schools, and the fights over
conditions on voucher providers will arise in these other contexts as well.
These observations are not merely academic. The 1996 welfare reform statute expressly
recognized the role that religious organizations may play in welfare-to-work programs,248 and the
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Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
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Congress is currently considering reauthorization of that scheme. From the very first days of his
administration, President Bush has made it a centerpiece of his agenda to promote the inclusion of
faith-based organizations as partners with government in the provision of social services of many
kinds.249 Moreover, major bills have been introduced, in both the House250 and Senate,251 that
would expand the regime of “Charitable Choice,” as the welfare reform arrangements are known,
into a wide variety of other federally-financed social services.
These schemes typically include explicit affirmations of the right of religious
organizations to maintain their religious identity while serving the public as a partner with
government.252 Some of them explicitly affirm the right of faith-based organizations to prefer coreligionists in their hiring,253 though such discrimination is forbidden with respect to service
beneficiaries.254 All such proposals explicitly forbid faith-based organizations that obtain
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contracts with government from engaging in religious proselytizing, worship, or instruction with
government funds.255
Despite statutory prohibitions of this latter sort, charitable choice arrangements are thick
with constitutional questions about the financial relationship between government and faith-based
providers.256 The President and his advisors on this subject continually emphasize the need for a
“level playing field” on which secular and religious groups can compete for these contracts, but
constitutional limitations, reflected in Mitchell v. Helms257 and Agostini v. Felton,258 on direct
funding of religious activity by government impede that sort of leveling. Secular organizations
may obtain the government’s aid in the use of secular methods of service, but faith-intensive
organizations may not similarly get the government’s financial support for their religiously
distinctive methods of service.259

255

Id. at sec. 604a(j); see also H.R. 7, sec. 1994A(j).

256

Courts have begun to confront these questions. See, e.g., Freedom From Religion
Foundation Foundation v. McCallum, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14177 (W.D. Wisc. 2002) (states
may finance faith-intensive drug treatment in voucher program with genuine beneficiary choice).
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See McCallum, note xx supra. A crucial constitutional question for the charitable
choice movement is whether the constitutional prohibition on aid to “pervasively sectarian
organizations” survives Mitchell v. Helms. We think the prohibition does not so survive, but at
least one lower court has disagreed in the context of aid to social service efforts. ACLU of La. v.
Foster, UD District Court, ED La, Civil Action No. FILL IN, July 25, 2002 (enjoining aspects of
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Zelman, and its approval of voucher programs that transfer funds from government to
private religious organizations, represents under current law the only constitutionally acceptable
path for realizing the “level playing field” the President seeks. As applied to social service
programs, the voucher device would permit government to finance beneficiaries who choose to
obtain services at faith-based providers, so long as secular providers were among the available
choices. And the fact that the programs may have varying degrees of faith content, from the
mildest to the most intense, would itself have no effect on the program’s constitutional status.
Indeed, for service contexts in which faith-intensive methods are most comprehensive and widely
in use, voucher financing may be the only method that will permit faith-based providers to
participate at all.
Outside of education, however, the application of Zelman’s principles presents new and
less secure dimensions for voucher financing of faith-based services. To be sure, the requirement
of religion-neutral classes of voucher recipients and service providers should prove no more an
obstacle outside the education context than it did in Zelman. Moreover, the placement of the
burden of persuasion on those who challenge the voucher program certainly should bolster the
case for other programs that include faith-based providers.
With respect to the relevant universe of choices, however, voucher programs for services
other than education stand on less certain ground. Educational vouchers typically appear in
settings in which government provides the service itself, and offers a substantial number of the
available choices. In most areas of social service, by contrast, government tends to finance
privately provided services rather than to operate such programs directly. In some contexts, such

Louisiana abstinence program found to violate Establishment Clause).
88

as child care, there tends to be a healthy mix of religious and non-religious providers.260 For other
services, such as substance abuse treatment programs, the pool of providers tends to be dominated
by faith-based providers – especially if one considers, as most courts do, that 12-step programs
count as “religious.”261 In rural areas in particular, the overall number of service providers may
be quite small, and may in some locales be dominated by faith-intensive organizations, highly
motivated to fill social needs. In addition, particular service areas tend to attract more faithintensive service approaches or therapies than others. Welfare-to-work readily lends itself to
secular methods, but rehabilitation of prisoners,262 and programs designed to teach sexual
abstinence to teenagers,263 are likely to attract a high percentage of providers that use explicitly
religious methods to try to transform those with whom they are engaged. In such circumstances,
government may be under considerable pressure to bring secular providers into the service market,
although Zelman liberates the government from any obligation to ensure that the secular options
are as plentiful or as attractive as the religious ones.
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Freedom From Religion Foundation v. McCallum264 highlights the problem of government
provision of non-religious alternatives, constitutionally required to validate the choice of a faithbased provider as “true” and “independent.” McCallum is among the first, and thus far the most
important, of the decisions connecting the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause rulings to
charitable choice programs. In January, 2002, the court held unconstitutional a welfare-to-work
program that transferred funds from the state’s Department of Workforce Development (“DWD”)
to Faith Works, Inc, a faith-intensive treatment program for substance abuse. DWD made the
grants, which transferred $150,000 from DWD to Faithworks in 1998 and another $450,000 in
1999, in response to a proposal from Faith Works to provide a nine-month, residential “addiction
recovery program for men” that is a “faith-based, long-term residential, holistic program that
emphasizes spiritual, physical, emotional and economic wellness..”265 The program included 1) a
faith-enhanced, 12-step recovery process led by paid counselors and volunteer leaders; 2)
individual and group counseling by Faith Works counselors; 3) training in skills related to job
readiness and overall living; 4) housing assistance; and 5) aftercare counseling. The DWD grants
did not depend on the numbers of beneficiaries who chose to participate in the program.
Synthesizing the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on direct aid to religious entities, and
ephasizing the concurring opinion in Mitchell v. Helms, the court concluded that the central
question raised by this grant was whether any religious indoctrination that occurred in the
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DWD-financed program was “attributable to the state.”266 It then examined closely the details of
the program, including what the grant paid for and the degree of religious experience that was
included in the program. With respect to the particulars of the program, the court found that state
funds were supporting counselor salaries as well as other program expenses. Counselors were
participating in, among other things, faith-enhanced AA meetings at which attendance by
participants was mandatory, and counselors were always available “to facilitate transformation of
mind and soul of participants.”267 Moreover, the court expressed the view that traditional AA
meetings, even without the faith enhancement, are “religious as a matter of law.”268 Accordingly,
the court found that the state bore responsibility for directly financing religious experience for
program participants, and that the direct grant therefore violated the Establishment Clause.269
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The court rejected the argument by Faith Works that only 20% of counselor time was
devoted to spiritual counseling, and that Faith Works raised non-governmental funds sufficient to
support that 20%. Because the organization commingled its public and private funds, and
expected that spiritual activities would be integrated into all of the counselors’ responsibilities,
the government was effectively paying for religious experience for participants. Although the
court noted that the documents governing the grant specified that “grant monies may not be used
to attempt to support either religious or antireligious activities,” id. at xx, the court also observed
that the DWD’s agents ignored the faith components of the program (obvious from the
organization’s mission statement, employee handbook, and its proposal to DWD) and never
communicated to Faith Works that state funds should not be allocated to religious activities.
The court ruled that the state must show that it has an adequate system in place to safeguard
against direct state financial support for religious activity, and that unenforced, boilerplate
language in the contract would not be sufficient for this purpose. The court ruled that the DWD
funding of Faith Works violates the Establishment Clause and ordered the state “to cease all
funding of Faith Works through the [DWD] discretionary grant as it is currently implemented.”
Id. at xx.
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At the same time it made that ruling, however, the court took under advisement a related
constitutional claim against a beneficiary choice program involving Faith Works. This program
involved placement of drug offenders, by agents of the state’s Department of Corrections
(“DOC”), in substance abuse treatment at Faith Works, among other providers.270 In 1999, DOC
entered into a contract with Faith Works, under which DOC would pay Faith Works on a per
beneficiary basis if and when beneficiaries received services through the program.271 Under the
program, a DOC probation or parole agent would refer qualified offenders to substance abuse
treatment as an alternative to incarceration (or other forms of DOC control); beginning in 1999,
Faith Works was among a number of treatment programs in the Milwaukee area eligible to receive
DOC referrals. Faith Works was the only program offering nine- to twelve-month treatment,
compared to the two- to three-month programs offered by other providers. DOC policies
permitted agents to recommend Faith Works to eligible offenders, but required the agents to
inform offenders that non-religious treatment alternatives were available.
In July, 2002, the district court upheld the constitutionality of the DOC arrangement with
Faith Works.272 Drawing heavily from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Zelman, Judge
Crabb wrote that the chief question to be resolved was “whether offenders under the supervision
of the department who participate in the Faith Works program do so of their own independent,

270

The factual details in this paragraph are from Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.
V. McCallum, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14177 (ED Wisc, 7/26/02) (hereafter “McCallum II).
271

In the 1999 contract, DOC would reimburse Faith Works up to $50,000 for providing
five spaces in the nine-month program. DOC renewed the contract in 2000 and 2001 for only
two spaces.
272

McCallum II, note xx supra.
92

private choice.” To resolve the issue of “independent private choice,” Judge Crabb focused on the
DOC’s referral process, and based her decision on two considerations. First, she determined that
the DOC’s policy required its agents to offer a secular treatment alternative to offenders, and to
inform them that they were not required to attend Faith Works if they objected to its religious
content.273 Second, the judge found that “there is no evidence suggesting that offenders who reject
a particular program are punished in any way.”274
We have serious doubts about Judge Crabb’s analysis of the beneficiary choice program
operated by DOC. In her assessment of that choice, the judge followed closely Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Zelman, and, unsurprisingly, her analysis shares both the clarity
and the weaknesses of the Zelman majority. The district court’s inquiry into the offender’s choice
of treatment program, like the Supreme Court’s analysis of parental choice in Cleveland, does not
pay close attention to the possibility that the state is steering participants toward religious
experience.
Perhaps the starkest example of this inattention to the particular context of choice comes
in Judge Crabb’s comparison between the offenders under DOC control and the Cleveland
schoolchildren in the Zelman case. She asserts that the offenders are less “susceptible to
indoctrination” than schoolchildren and so their choices need no greater scrutiny than the Zelman
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Court provided. But the analogy is misleading for two reasons. First, the issue of susceptibility
focuses attention on the wrong point in time. It is no doubt true that children, captive in schools
for many hours per day and many weeks per year, are vulnerable to indoctrination; but Zelman
means that, in a properly designed voucher program, parents and children are free to choose their
preferred source of indoctrination. The voucher model is not focused on susceptibility per se.
Instead, the model is concerned with susceptibility to state influence at a particular point in time –
when the participant is deciding what kind of experience to accept in the chosen school or
program, not when the participant has already entered it.
This first mistake leads into the second problem with the court’s analogy. The court
misleads through its contrast between the adult offender and the school child, suggesting that
because the offenders are adults, they have greater capacity to give meaningful consent than the
schoolchildren. Schoolchildren do not make the decision alone on which school to attend; indeed
the decision must be made by their parents. These parents certainly face the legal pressure of
compulsory school attendance laws and the practical pressure that arises from their desire to have
their children attend safe and challenging schools, and yet the Zelman court did not think those
pressures coerced parents into choosing religious options.
Contrast those pressures, however, with the context in which the DOC offender chooses.
To begin with, the offender is by definition a substance abuser, perhaps even struggling with the
symptoms of withdrawal. This physical condition itself may impair the capacity for choice; and
such an impairment may be most severe in those cases in which long-term residential treatment is
warranted. Moreover, the offender receives a recommendation to attend a religious facility from
an agent of the state, an agent who holds the power to recommend significantly greater restrictions
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on the offender, including incarceration, if the offender fails to meet the conditions set for parole
or probation. Even though the agent is required to inform the offender of a secular alternative, the
DOC agent’s expressed preference may well impinge on the “genuinely private and independent”
choice of the offender.275
Despite Zelman’s broad warrant to uphold the constitutionality of voucher programs, we
think that courts in the future should examine issues of “independent choice” more carefully,
especially when the choosers may be suffering cognitive incapacities. Although Zelman counsels
strongly against close judicial evaluation of the relative merits of secular versus religious
providers, it does not preclude examining participants’ capacity for choice.276 Moreover, as we
have argued elsewhere,277 the state should be held to a duty to take affirmative steps to ensure the
presence of secular options. This duty was satisfied in Zelman by the wide range of public school
choices in Cleveland, but voucher programs for social services, frequently lacking these publicly
operated counterparts, may present entirely different circumstances.
Zelman, especially as glossed in Freedom From Religion Foundation v. McCallum,
suggests that vouchers are indeed the path of least constitutional resistance for government
partnerships with faith-intensive providers. As noted in Part IIB, however, voucher programs are
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likely to face significant political controversy when proposed for any social service, education or
otherwise. Although providers in such programs have in the past tended to get less governmental
scrutiny and control than those working under direct government grants,278 more widespread use
of vouchers in the future will likely invite an increase in regulatory attention. Just as in the case
of education, civil rights advocates will press for restrictions on the employment practices of
service providers, targeting those providers who discriminate in favor of co-religionists and
against gays and lesbians.279 Moreover, any expansion of social services to include voucher
arrangements at faith-based organizations may well invite new demands for accountability of
providers. Here too the rules of neutrality, presumptively requiring the same treatment of secular
and religious providers, will control.
In addition, voucher programs are less likely than direct grants and contracts to induce
faith-based organizations into the service arena. Unlike fixed-price contracts, vouchers cannot
provide seed money to start new programs or provide a stable financial base on which to build a
service program. From the perspective of providers, vouchers may be constitutionally secure but
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economically unpromising. From the perspective of government administrators, eager to lure new
groups of providers into the regime of charitable choice, vouchers may not have the quick and
large payoff that agencies would like, whether for reasons of publicity, patronage, or provision of
service.
Whatever the political dynamics, Zelman virtually guarantees that vouchers will play a
central role in the ongoing debate over the role of faith-based organizations in governmentfinanced social service. If this or any other Administration, state or federal, wants a “level playing
field” for religious and non-religious organizations, vouchers have become the constitutionally
appropriate route. Political resistance to efforts to go down this path will surely emerge, but
constitutionally knowledgeable administrators are already preparing their voucher plans as a way
to include faith-intensive organizations in a variety of social services.280
CONCLUSION
Zelman is thinly reasoned, but it presents a key that opens many doors. The opportunities
it presents are both theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, the decision may force a
long overdue reconsideration, by judges and others, of Establishment Clause premises and
principles. The pervasive anti-Catholic sentiment that drove Separationism from the 1940's to
the 1980's is well behind us, but the questions of religion’s distinctive place in our constitutional
ethos remain. And the tangled issues of the relationship between federal and state constitutional
law, now squarely framed by government’s financial relations with religious entities, present a
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rich context in which to think through afresh a set of questions as old as the Republic.
On the practical side, the opportunities seem even more pressing. Lawyers and judges
have the luxury of watching and waiting as new principles emerge and work themselves pure.
The questions of how and where we educate our children – especially those whose family wealth
puts them in a disadvantageous position – and how we care for the least fortunate among us,
demand immediate attention. Folding those concerns in with proper constitutional respect for the
role of religious organizations, and limits on state power in dealing with such entities, is a
formidable challenge. To ignore that challenge, ostrich-like, is to leave the field to those who
would remake the Constitution in their zeal for government exploitation of religious faith.

98

